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I. Introduction
Criticism of the Supreme Court as excessively activist abounds in
the law reviews,' in the political science literature,2 and in the popular
* Professor and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank
Susan Bandes, Paul Cassell, Barry Friedman, Rick Hasen, Steve Heyman, Mike Klarman, Bill
Marshall, and the participants in aUniversity ofVirginia SchoolofLawworkshop forcomments
on earlier drafts.
1. See the discussions in Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
is a Constitutional Expansion ofRights, 39 WM. & MARYL. REv. 601,602 (1998); Michael J.
Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 748-68
(1991); Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term - Comment: Institutions &
Interpretation: A Critique ofCity ofBoeme v. Flores, 111 HARV.L.REV. 153, 169-95 (1997);
Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court
Activism, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 67, 69-70; Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM.
U. L. REV. 1367, 1381-1401 (1996).
2. See, e.g., ROBERTH. BORK, THETEMpTiNGOFAMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 129-32 (1990); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
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press The criticism is neither new nor particularly shocking given that
judges, like the rest of us, have political preferences. However, the Court has
opened itself to a more intense fusillade by relying on a variety of institutional
justifications in interpreting the constitutional text. The Court's invocation
of institutional and political factors in construing the Constitutionjeopardizes
its legitimacy as an independent third branch of government. As a result the
Court seemingly has discarded a mantle of neutrality to don instead an overtly
political cloak.
The Court's explicit discussion and consideration of factors other than
the merits of a case, however, should not be alarming. The Court not only sits
at the apex of the judiciary, but also exists within our system of separated
powers and federalism. In addition to analyzing legal issues, the Court must-
and would be incredibly naive not to - consider the impact of constitutional
rulings on lower courts, coordinate branches, state governments, and society
as a whole. The Court may occupy a special role in construing the constitu-
tional text,4 but political and administrative realities temper the Court's
interpretive function.
In essence, the Supreme Court shares many attributes of any enforcement
agency.' The Court must assess how best, given its limited resources, to
control, or at least to influence, constitutional interpretation by others.6 The
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 336-43 (1991); THOMAs G.WALKER & LEE EPSTEIN, THE SUPREME
COURTOFTHEUNrrED STATES: ANINTRODUCTION 19(1993); David P. Bryden,A Conservative
Case for Judicial Activism, 111 PUB. INTEREST 72 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Thomas L. Jipping, Fightingfor Justices, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at
A15; Anthony Lewis, Justices on a Mission, N.Y. TIMEfs, June 30, 1997, at Al1. Even the
Senate is taking a turn. See generally Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem & Its Impact,
1997: Hearings on S.J Res. 26Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism & Prop-
erty Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1-3 (1997) (opening comment
of Senator Ashcroft).
4. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.").
5. For a sampling of the literature on enforcement agencies, see generally EUGENE
BARDACH&ROBERTA. KAGAN, GOINGBYTHEBOOK (1982) (discussing enforcement agencies);
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (same); CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR.,
ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990) (same).
6. One need not join the debate about whether judges attempt to maximize political
preference or prestige in discharging theirjudicial tasks to conclude thatjudges care that others
follow their view of constitutional rights. Judges may care for reasons of institutional prove-
nance, distrust of other would-be interpreters, or personal politics. See Neal Kumar Katyal,
Judges As Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1709-23 (1998) (sketching advice role of
judges in constitutional sphere). Indeed, some might consider it the courts' duty to ensure the
primacy of their views. Cf Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitu-
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enforcement tools of the Supreme Court, however, are limited. Unlike most
agencies, the Court cannot engage in substantive rulemaking, it has no en-
forcement agents, and it cannot institute suit.7 Instead, the Court must rely
almost exclusively upon its power to decide - or not to decide - cases and
controversies.
When confronted with a novel or a difficult constitutional claim, the
Court, like other enforcement agencies, may decline to act. The Court can
deny certiorari, and it also may find a case nonjusticiable even after granting
certiorari.' Thus, even more than most enforcement agencies, the Supreme
Court has great flexibility in choosing its docket. Through exercise of such
"passive virtues," the Court can avoid tackling constitutional issues that it is
not prepared to address and can allow other actors more direct say in formulat-
ing constitutional doctrine.9
The Court plays a more direct role by deciding cases and controversies.
When resolving issues, the Court, again like any enforcement agency, must
fashion rules in a way that will invite obedience by others such as lower
courts, Congress, and state legislatures. As has been often noted, bright-line
rules serve the Court well by providing a framework for future conduct." In
addition, the Court must craft constitutional rules that lower courts can
administer-not always a simple task." Moreover, the Court at times will use
tionalInterpretation, 1 1OHARv.L.REv. 1359, 1369-81 (1997) (arguing thatjudicial interpreta-
tions of Constitution must be predominant).
7. See Colin Diver, Regulatory Precision, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 199, 199
(Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1989) (commenting that, for agencies "[tihe framing
of a rule is, indeed, the climactic act of the policymaking process").
8. See ALExANDERM. BICKEL, TBELEASTDANGEROUSBRANCH: THE SUPREMECOURT
ATTHEBAROFPoLrrICs 113-98 (2d ed. 1986); see also H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDINGTODECIDE:
AGENDA SETrTG INTHEUNrrED STATES SUPREMECOURT40-91 (1991); Samuel Estreicher &
John Sexton, Improving the Process: Case Selection by the Supreme Court, 70 JUDICATURE
41, 41-45 (1986).
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term -Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV.L.REv. 4,6-43 (1996) (focusing onjudicial minimalization ofdecisions
to enhance democratic processes).
10. For a representative commentary on the strategy ofchoosing between balancing tests
and bright-line rules, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age ofBalancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 945-72 (1987); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An EconomicAnal-
ysis, 42,DUKEL.J. 557,586-96 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-
Foreword: The Justices of Rules & Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-69 (1992).
11. Commentators have long believed that the Court stopped actively enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine, and, until recently, the Commerce Clause limitations on Congress's
authority at least in part for reasons of lack of administrability. See, e.g., Louis L. JAFFE,
JUDICIALCONTROLOFADMINISTRATVEACION64-72 (1965) (addressing difficulties injudicial
application of nondelegation doctrine); Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the
National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645, 645-53 (1946) (addressing lack of manageable
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its certiorari power to superintend the workings of lower federal and state
courts. The Court's recent contretemps with the Ninth Circuit illustrate that
the Court must manage lower courts as well as exercise its role as the arbiter
of constitutional meaning.' 2
The Court can also wield its authority effectively by overenforcing or
underenforcing constitutional rights. The Court's enforcement strategy can
lead the Court to consider more than just constitutional interpretation and
precedent when it is addressing the merits of a constitutional claim. Depend-
ing upon the presence of institutional or federalism factors, the Court may
either deny a claim and leave it to other institutional actors to provide more
constitutional protection, or may grant the claim if it fears that, absent such a
ruling, other actors would frustrate recognition of an underlying constitutional
norm.
Two relatively familiar examples may prove helpful. First, in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,3 the Court declined to enforce
the Tenth Amendment principally for institutional reasons. 4 The Court
previously had struggled in fashioning a test to determine which state func-
tions to preserve from federal interference. 5 In rejecting a challenge to the
application of the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to a municipal body,
the Court reasoned that a judicially crafted test to distinguish integral from
other state functions was "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." 6
Despite the Court's decision notto enforce the Tenth Amendment directly, the
Court signaled that the Tenth Amendment norm continued to merit consider-
ation.
In legislating, Congress presumably still considers the Tenth Amendment
norm to the extent that it considers any constitutional question. 7 Indeed,
standards to restrict congressional action under Commerce Clause).
12. See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. 1489, 1492 (1998) (criticizing court of
appeals for recalling mandate denying habeas relief in death penalty case); Vasquez v. Harris,
503 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1992) (vacating order staying execution).
13. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
14. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985).
15. Seeid. at530.
16. Id. at 546. The Court justified its refusal to enforce the Tenth Amendment on the
ground that political process checks existed to monitor Congress's regulation of state and local
governmental authorities, namely that state and local governments enjoyed an ample voice in
Congress's affairs. Id. at 552; see McConnell, supra note 1, at 173 (arguing that Court should
deferto congressional interpretation of constitutional text whenjudicially appropriate standards
are wanting).
17. Obviously, members of Congress do not usually pore over constitutional law tomes
prior to voting on proposals. Most members of Congress are probably inclined to allow the
judiciary to resolve any disputed issue. Members of Congress, however, have the obligation to
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Congress amended the FLSA after Garcia to protect local governments from
some of the FLSA's provisions." Thus, a constitutional provision can retain
vitality even when not actively enforced by the judiciary. 9 In a system
marked by separated powers and federalism, the Court logically may allow
institutional factors to shape constitutional rights.2°
Second, the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims2 concluded that appor-
tionment in state legislatures must conform to a "one person, one vote" rule.'
The Court predicated its "one person, one vote" ruling on the Equal Protection
Clause: "[T]he fundamental principle of representative government in this
country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without
regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State."'
The impact of the Supreme Court's ruling was dramatic and immediate -
nearly every state reapportioned its legislature in reaction to the decision.
On the merits, however, the Court's decision is quite problematic. The
Court itself noted that Reynolds prohibits states from adopting the federal
electoral model within their own jurisdictions because senatorial elections
uphold the Constitution. As a result, some may solicit the views of others regarding the
constitutionality of various provisions, and others may, in fact, reach an independent view of
the constitutional question prior to voting.
18. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (1985)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (1994)). Moreover, the Court has construed
legislation narrowly in light of Tenth Amendment concerns to preserve state sovereignty. In
Gregory v. Ashcroft, for example, the Court determined that Congress had not evinced a clear
enough intent to subject state judges to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991). The Court explained that its clear statement approach
to the interpretation of legislation ensures "that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended
to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." Id. at 461 (quoting
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1974)).
19. Recently, however, the Court has more actively enforced the Tenth Amendment. See
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2380 (1997) (limiting scope of Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act because Congress cannot compel states to enforce federal law); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,155-69 (1992) (stating that Congress cannot compel states
to enforce federal regulatory programs).
20. One can view the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo from a similar
perspective. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Court in Buckley may
have upheld the $1000 contribution limitation on the ground that, despite the First Amendment
interests at stake, Congress was institutionally better able to set an appropriate limit. Id. at 24-
30. For another example, the Court's restrictive interpretation of the Second Amendment also
may reflect underenforcement See generally Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second
Amendment as an "Underenforced Constitutional Norm," 21 HARv. LL. & PUB. POL'Y 719
(1998).
21. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
22. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-68 (1964).
23. let at 560-61.
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deviate from a "one person, one vote" principle.24 In addition, under
Reynolds, states cannot choose an electoral system that affords greater repre-
sentation to communities, whether based on geography, ethnicity, or shared
political views, that otherwise might not have a sufficient voice.' The "one
person, one vote" principle sweeps away all such distinctions, even when a
supermajority of the state supports affording representation on similar
grounds.26 Despite the questionable pedigree, the Court subsequently applied
the Reynolds rule to local elections as well.27
Whatever the theoretical problems, the "one person, one vote" rule boasts
compelling administrative advantages. The rule is easy to administer and it
avoids the necessity of secondguessing each state deviation from the "one
person, one vote" principle.2" Given that Reynolds was, in part, prompted by
the Court's distrust of state legislators,29 the Court's creation of a bright-line
rule made evident sense. Having been "cautioned about the dangers of
entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires," 0 the Court
crafted a one size fits all solution.3 The Court may therefore have over-
24. Id. at 575-77.
25. Id. at 577-81.
26. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 737 (1964) (rejecting
apportionment plan passed by considerable majority of electorate). Justice Stewart commented
in his dissent in Lucas that:
I could not join in the fabrication of a constitutional mandate which imports and
forever freezes one theory of political thought into our Constitution, and forever
denies to every State any opportunity for enlightened and progressive innovation
in the design of its democratic institutions, so as to accommodate within a system
of representative government the interests and aspirations of diverse groups of
people, without subjecting any group or class to absolute domination by a geo-
graphically concentrated or highly organized majority.
Id. at 748-49 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
27. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (applying
Reynolds rule of close scrutiny to apportionment statute that may dilute effectiveness of some
votes); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,478-79 (1968) (applyingReynolds ruleto local
elections); see also Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1970) (applying Kramer
rule to invalidate restrictions on bond issue election).
28. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964) (acknowledging potential line-
drawing difficulties). "No judicially manageable standard can determine whether a State should
have single-member districts or multimember districts or some combination of both." Id. at 621
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 583.
30. Id. at 566.
31. In a criticism of the Court's application of the "one person, one vote" rule in Lucas,
Justice Stewart commented that "the Court says that the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause can be met in any State only by the uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed application
of sixth-grade arithmetic." Lucas, 377 U.S. at 750 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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enforced the representation norm. Reynolds should have signaled to state
legislatures that the Court might be more accommodating if it could be con-
vinced that its fears of legislative self-dealing were unfounded.
The Court has since retreated from Reynolds to some extent. The Court
has held that the "one person, one vote" principle does not apply in the context
of special voting districts.32 Concerns for legislative entrenchment in such
districts presumably are not as great. Courts now look to a variety of factors
to determine whether to permit deviations from the "one person, one vote"
principle in elections at the local level.3" Thus, when the Court overenforces
a constitutional norm, as in Reynolds, the Court sends the flipside of the signal
sent in Garcia - it may narrow the protection of the underlying right in future
cases.34 Both underenforcement and overenforcement ofa constitutional norm
spur a dialogue among the Court and other institutional actors regarding the
appropriate sphere of protection for the implicated constitutional right.
Viewing the Supreme Court as an enforcement agency leads to striking
consequences. To the extent that the Court, because of institutional and
federalism concerns, underenforces a constitutional holding as in Garcia,
legislators, and perhaps lower court judges, should be free to adopt different
interpretations of the constitutional text.35 The Court's avowal of limitations
on its own authority should carry with it a recognition of a more robust
interpretive role for other institutional actors.
32. See Ballv. James, 451 U.S. 355,371 (1981) (upholding voting restrictions in context
of water reclamation district); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 734-35 (1973) (upholding voting restrictions in water storage district).
33. See Plowman v. Massad, 61 F.3d 796,798 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding geographical
districting for election to state dental board); Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n,
960 F. Supp. 760, 775-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding voting restrictions for election to Board
of Directors of Grand Central District Management Association); Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F.
Supp. 1547, 1555-58 (D. Haw. 1997) (upholding voting restrictions for election for Trustees
of Office of Hawaiian Affairs). See generally Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One
Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CaI. L. REV. 339 (1993).
34. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 190,
196 (1988) (justifying prophylactic rules on basis that they reduce risk of improper action by
state and local officials).
35. The political question doctrine functions in a similar way. The Court often permits
and even invites other political actors to interpret particular constitutional terms. See Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224,226-30 (1993) (deferring to Senate's construction of what it means
under Article I, § 3 to "try" impeachments). See generally Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question"Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (commenting on political question doctrine); J.
Peter Mulhem, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1988)
(same); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1031 (1985) (same).
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On the other hand, if the Court has overenforced a constitutional norm
as in Reynolds, the Court may choose to reconsider the parameters of the
constitutional norm when convinced that the institutional factors prompting
the need for overenforcement have subsided.36 Legislators may heed the
overenforcement signal and impose greater protection for the underlying right
in the hope that the Supreme Court will scale back the constitutional ruling.
Moreover, lower courts should not mistake the overenforced constitutional
norm for a ruling on the merits. Judicial decisions overtly based on factors
unrelated to interpretation of the constitutional right at stake logically invite
other institutional actors to participate in the ultimate refining of that right. 7
Part II of this Article explains briefly why the Supreme Court might, for
strategic reasons, underenforce constitutional rights. Whether because of its
own uncertainty as to the merits or because of institutional obstacles, the
Court may welcome other actors' participation in drawing the boundaries of
the implicated right. The Garcia case presents a paradigm, but one can view
other less obvious candidates as underenforcement decisions as well. The
remainder of Part II focuses on the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,"8 which, at first glance,
may seem worlds apart from Garcia.39 In DeShaney, the Court refused to hold
a municipal social services department responsible under the Due Process
Clause for standing by and allowing a father to beat his young son senseless. 0
In dismissing the boy's suit, the Court seemingly closed the door on all but the
most extraordinary due process claims that are based on the government's
failure to protect individuals from harms caused by third parties. Another
reading of DeShaney, however, is possible. One may view DeShaney against
the backdrop of judicial hesitancy in tort suits to secondguess governmental
36. By using the term "overenforcement," I am not suggesting that the constitutional right
at stake necessarily warrants less protection. Rather, the term signifies that the Court may not
afford that same level of protection when other institutional actors furnish additional safeguards.
The right itself may receive similar protection, but not at the hands of the Court.
37. Readers of judicial opinions can never know for certain the role that institutional
factors play in the Court's decisions. However, when the Court explicitly relies on institutional
factors, it sends an unmistakable signal to the coordinate branches and the lower courts. The
Court likely will have the opportunity to revisit the constitutional question that it arguably
overenforced or underenforced and, at that time, to determine anew whether the prior decision
interpreted the constitutional right to its conceptual limits. Arguably, one can understand the
Court's decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores in that vein. See generally City of Boeme v. Flores,
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); infra text accompanying notes 187-92.
38. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
39. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,191 (1989).
40. Id. The son suffered severe brain damage as a result of the abuse. See id. at 203
("The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did
nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them.").
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policies that implicate resource allocation decisions.4" Institutionally, courts
are poorly equipped to evaluate the budgetary and political tradeoffs that
exposed the governmental entity to suit. As a result, the Supreme Court in
DeShaney may well have underenforced the due process norm.
Part I focuses on overenforcement. In addition to Reynolds, the deci-
sion in Miranda v. Arizona4 poses a helpful illustration.43 Although Miranda
warnings stem from the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the
Court has justified Miranda warnings on institutional rather than constitu-
tional grounds.' According to the Court, the warnings are necessary because
of the inability or the unwillingness of state and federal officials to ensure that
the right against self-incrimination is preserved.4 In other words, the Court
has left open the possibility that the Miranda warnings might no longer be
required if state courts or legislatures imposed greater restraints on police
officers.46 Miranda, therefore, is not necessarily the last word on what
constitutes a voluntary confession.
Part IV addresses the ramifications of predicating constitutional decisions
on institutional factors. In the underenforcement context, Congress, through
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, may enforce the constitutional right
more robustly than has the Supreme Court in prior decisions such as De-
Shaney. As a consequence, Congress could enact legislation that permits suits
in DeShaney-type contexts. Moreover, if decisions such as DeShaney do not
reflect the Supreme Court's view on the merits of the constitutional norm,
then statejurists arguably need not follow those cases when reviewing federal
constitutional claims within their own states. Federalism concerns do not
counsel caution, and the same institutional concerns underlying DeShaney
may not be present when state judges review the actions of municipal govern-
ments or lower courts within their own jurisdictions. State judges generally
are more politically accountable than their federal counterparts, and they may
wish to exert tighter control upon municipal government and jury discretion.
By underenforcing constitutional norms, the Supreme Court can signal solici-
41. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process
Clause, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 982, 1002-16 (1996). Professor Armacost attempts what many must
believe a futile task - rehabilitating DeShaney.
42. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467 (1966) (expressing need to create proper
safeguards to protect right against self-incrimination).
44. Id.
45. Oregonv. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985).
46. For a discussion ofthe propriety ofconstitutional prophylactic rules, compare Strauss,
supra note 34, at 195-207 with JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW, 173-
222 (1993).
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tude for those norms without facing the institutional costs arising from full-
fledged recognition of the constitutional claims.
In the overenforcement context, Supreme Court decisions should spur
legislatures and lower courts to consider alternative mechanisms to ensure
protection of the constitutional right. For example, two years after the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Miranda, Congress provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 that
a confession should be admitted into evidence "if it is voluntarily given."'
Under this statute, the existence of a prior Miranda warning, though a factor
in proving voluntariness, is not essential." Remarkably, only one court of
appeals in over thirty years has assessed the validity of § 3501." Although
§ 3501 does not provide alternative safeguards to the warnings required in
Miranda, other changes in the legal landscape may nonetheless suggest that
the need for Miranda warnings has waned over time. In light of such changes,
the Court should now assess whether it should dispense with or at least alter
the Miranda warnings. And, that responsibility should be shared with lower
courts in the federal and state systems, some of which already have imposed
alternative safeguards to protect an individual's right against self-incrimina-
tion. Decisions overenforcing constitutional norms inMirandaandReynolds-
much like the decisions underenforcing constitutional provisions inDeShaney
and Garcia - open a dialogue with other institutional actors regarding the
ultimate contours of the constitutional right.
1I. Underenforcement
Twenty years ago, Lawrence Sager innovatively articulated an underen-
forcement thesis."0 Sager expounded the view that constitutional norms are
valid even when the judiciary does not enforce the norms because of institu-
tional concerns.5 ' Focusing on the Equal Protection Clause 2 and the Takings
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994).
48. Id. § 3501(d).
49. See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1975). The dearth
of judicial consideration stems in part from the government's reluctance to rely on § 3501 as
authority to admit into evidence statements that were not preceded by Miranda warnings. See
infra note 215 and accompanying text.
50. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-28 (1978).
51. See id. at 1221. Sager's thesis owes an intellectual debt to the work done by James
Bradley Thayer at the end of the last century. Id. at 1222. Thayer eloquently championed
judicial deference to the legislative branch. See James B. Thayer, The Origin andScope ofthe
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 151-56 (1893). Thayer's
views in turn built on the work of others. Id. at 138-46. For a discussion of Thayer's legacy,
see generally Symposium, One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial
Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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Clause,53 Sager concluded that other institutional actors - principally Con-
gress and the state courts - are obligated to interpret such underenforced
norms for themselves. 4
The underenforcement thesis subsequently flowered in a context that
Professor Sager evidently did not anticipate-the Tenth Amendment. Specifi-
cally, in Garcia, the Court relied on institutional factors in its decision to
decline enforcement of Tenth Amendment restrictions on Congress.55 How-
ever, in so doing, the Court stressed the obligation of other actors to give
content to the right at stake. 6
In contrast, the underenforcement thesis has not taken hold in the two
individual rights contexts stressed by Professor Sager - equal protection and
property rights. On one occasion, the Court explicitly rejected the signifi-
cance of any underenforcement notion.57 Nonetheless, the Court's frequent
invocation of institutional constraints on its authority warrants renewed
consideration of the underenforcement thesis.58 Underenforcement may occur
52. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
54. See Sager, supra note 50, at 1227-28.
55. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-57 (1985).
56. See id. at 551-52.
57. See Minnesotav. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,461 n.6 (1981) (rejecting
underenforcement notion that state court can impose greater restrictions than Supreme Court
has enforced in equal protection context). Justices have adverted to the underenforcement thesis
on at least one other occasion. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
58. Justice Kennedy, who wielded the pivotal vote in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,
rejected the plurality's application of the Takings Clause to government regulations that did not
disturb traditional property rights. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2154 (1998). He
explained that "extending regulatory takings analysis to the amorphous class of cases" involving
fees and taxes "would throw one of the most difficult and litigated areas of the law into con-
fusion, subjecting states and municipalities to the potential of new and unforeseen claims." Id.
at 2155.
In a joint dissent in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr and O'Hare Truck
Service, Inc. v. City ofNorthlake, Justice Scalia stated that "[a]nother factor that suggests we
should stop this new enterprise at government employment is the much greater volume of
litigation that its extension to the field of contracting entails." Board of County Comm'rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 697 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further warned that
the majority opinion that forbade patronage in the independent contractor context would foster
a "much greater volume of litigation." Id. The majority disputed not the relevance of Justice
Scalia's inquiry but rather the empirical basis for his charge. It retorted that it was aware "of
no evidence of excessive or abusive litigation" over other government contracting laws. See id.
at 684.
Concern for opening the floodgates of litigation is not new. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693,694-95 (1976). The litigation in Paul v. Davis involved tort-like injuries inflicted by
municipal officials. Id. at 694-97. In rejecting the liberty interest claim, the Court stated that
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in individual rights cases as well as in structural cases like Garcia, and
parallel concerns of federalism and institutional resources can apply in each.
Numerous academics,59 as well as the dissenters in DeShaney, ° have
derided the DeShaney majority for its stinting and inhumane construction of
the Due Process Clause. Yet, the Court's decision can be understood to rest
on institutional and federalism concerns, as well as on the Court's view of the
merits. The decision arguably does not close the door on all failure-to-protect
claims based on the Due Process Clause, but rather reflects the Court's
enforcement strategies.
In a recent article, Professor Armacost defends the Court's decision in
DeShaney on the ground that courts are institutionally ill-equipped to second-
guess the level and the distribution of municipal services. 1 She argues that
authorizing suit in the failure-to-protect context would inevitably distort a
municipality's political priorities by forcing it to adopt excessive precaution-
ary measures. 2 Her position is at least plausible. Entertaining DeShaney's
claim might have forced the Court to ascertain how much money the county
should have devoted to child protection services, how often child protection
workers should have scheduled follow-up visits, and at what point the
Winnebago County Social Services Department should have removed Joshua
from his father's custody. 3 Federal judges do not have the expertise to
if it were to recognize such a claim, then it would be "hard to perceive any logical stopping
place" for such litigation. Id. at 698-99.
59. See Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 403,403-
06 (1993); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271,
2287-97 (1990); Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The
Politics ofDeShaney, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1078, 1086-1111; Theodore Y. Blumoff, Some Moral
Implications ofFinding No State Action, 70 NoTRE DAME L. Rnv. 95, 97-106 (1994); Thomas
A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inactions as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and
Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REv. 107, 111-27 (1991); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of
Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 571
(1991); Louis Michael Seidman, The StateAction Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 379,382-
401 (1993); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" ofDeShaney,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1513, 1514-15 (1989); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government
Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SuP. CT. Rnv. 53, 53-54; Laurence H. Tribe, The Curva-
ture of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 8-14 (1989).
60. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Poor Joshua!").
61. See Armacost, supra note 41, at 1002-09.
62. Id. at 1009-14.
63. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202-03. Municipal authorities had intervened to the extent
of counseling the father, directing that Joshua be enrolled in day care, encouraging the father's
live-in girlfriend to move out, and, at one point, removing the child from the father's care for
a short period of time. Id. at 192-93.
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evaluate the appropriate level of services that municipal child welfare depart-
ments provide." Ultimately, to protect themselves from liability, municipali-
ties might be forced to transform or even to contract out child protection
services."
Much of the language in the DeShaney opinion suggests a restrictive
construction of the Due Process Clause. The Court described the Due Process
Clause "as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security."" The Court also stated that the
purpose of the clause "was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure
that the State protected them from each other."67 It concluded that because
"the State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua against his father's
violence, its failure to do so - though calamitous in hindsight - simply does
not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause."68
The Court, however, acknowledged that "in certain limited circumstances
the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care with respect
to particular individuals."69 In several contexts, the Court has recognized that
governmental failures to protect individuals while they are in governmental
custody violate the Constitution. In Youngberg v. Romeo,70 for example, the
Court concluded that the Due Process Clause requires the state to provide a
minimum level of services to involuntarily committed mental patients.71
Similarly, in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital,' the Court
determined that the Due Process Clause mandates that governmental authori-
ties provide adequate medical care to suspects in police custody who are
injured during the police apprehension.73 As the Court explained in De-
Shaney, "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there
against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for his safety."'74
64. In DeShaney, Justice Rehnquist noted that, "had [municipal authorities] moved too
soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they would likely have been met with
charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship." Id. at 203.
65. See Armacost, supra note 41, at 1033-36.
66. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
67. Id at 196.
68. Id. at 202.
69. Id. at 198.
70. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
71. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-19 (1982).
72. 463 U.S. 239 (1983).
73. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-46 (1983).
74. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
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Within one week after the DeShaney decision, the Court in City of
Canton v. Harris' held that police departments could be liable for their failure
to protect individuals because of the departments' inadequate training of per-
sonnel.76 In City of Canton, the plaintiff alleged that police officials exacer-
bated her injuries by providing her with improper medical care while she was
in custody.77 The Court did not limit its decision to the custody context.
Rather, the Court found that liability exists "where the failure to train amounts
to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come
into contact."7" In at least some situations, therefore, the Due Process Clause
prohibits the government from withholding services or benefits in ways that
cause tort-like deprivations of life, liberty, or property.79
As several commentators have noted, if the Due Process Clause requires
affirmative governmental acts to protect individuals while they are in govern-
mental custody, then the same theory should apply to failure-to-protect claims
arising outside of physical custody."0 City of Canton, in fact, suggests as
much.8' Moreover, nothing in the Due Process Clause exonerates the govern-
ment from protecting individuals from third parties. Indeed, the Court has
imposed affirmative government obligations under the Due Process Clause in
other contexts. 2 Determining the required level of care in governmental
custody cases may be easier than defining that standard in noncustody cases,
but the conceptual framework should be the same for both. DeShaney,
therefore, differs from the other cases in degree, not in kind.
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights3 supports the view that the Court stayed its hand in DeShaney at least
75. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
76. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,388 (1989). To recover in cases alleging
a failure to train, plaintiffs must satisfy an intent standard of deliberate indifference. Id. at 389.
77. See id. at 381-82 (discussing plaintiff's claim).
78. Id. at 388.
79. The Supreme Court also has recognized that failure-to-protect claims under the Eighth
Amendment may exist in prison cases. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-47
(1994) (discussing prison liability for Eighth Amendment violations).
80. See Eaton & Wells, supra note 59, at 122-23; Strauss, supra note 59, at 63-68. If the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty upon the government to protect individuals against
violence, then the DeShaney decision can be defended only on institutional grounds. See
Heyman, supra note 59, at 570-71.
81. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 386-87.
82. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 872-86 (1986); see also Bandes, supra note 59, at 2323-26 (critiquing unhelpful distinc-
tion between affirmative and negative rights); Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under
Information Asymmetry: The Effect ofFraming on Legal Rules, 38 UCLAL. REv. 391,436-37
(1990) (addressing speculative nature of distinction between action and inaction).
83. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
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partially for institutional reasons.' In Collins, the widow of a city employee
alleged that the city's failure to keep its workplace free from unreasonable
hazards violated the Due Process Clause. The employee was asphyxiated
while working on underground sewer lines. In affirming the lower court's dis-
missal of the claim, the Court explained that:
[d]ecisions concerning the allocation of resources to individual programs,
such as sewer maintenance, and to particular aspects of those programs,
such as the training and compensation of employees, involve a host of
policy choices that must be made by locally elected representatives, rather
than by federal judges interpreting the basic charter of Government for the
entire country. 5
Federal courts, through the Due Process Clause, should not review municipal
policy choices best left to majoritarian governance. Collins manifests judicial
reluctance to use scarce judicial resources to become embroiled in such tort-
like contexts. 6 The decision arguably does not demarcate the limits of the
Due Process Clause. The Court decided to conserve its enforcement resources
for another day.
Contrast Collins with the Supreme Court's decisions that address a due
process right to reproductive autonomy. In cases such as Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services 7 and Planned Parenthoodv. Casey88 - decided in the
same terms as DeShaney and Collins, respectively - the Court rejected, in
part, substantive due process claims on the merits without mention of the
institutional constraints facing the Court. 9 The Court confined the substan-
84. See Collins v. City ofHarkerHeights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (declining to expand
due process to nonprocedural government action). At one point, the Court in DeShaney sug-
gested that its holding reflected an understanding that the Due Process Clause "does not require
the State to provide its citizens with particular protective services." DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). Rather, it is for the state, "through its
courts and legislatures, [to] impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its
agents as it wishes." Id. at 202.
85. Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-29. In County ofSacramento v. Lewis, the Court followed
DeShaney and Collins and declined to recognize a due process claim that arose from a police
cruiser chase. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1713-14 (1998). The
Court reached its decision by focusing on the police officers' need for instantaneous judgment
when they are pursuing a suspect. Id at 1720. When those institutional concerns are not
present, however, the Court suggested that a due process suit - as in Canton - might be proper.
See id. at 1716-18; supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
86. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125.
87. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
88. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
89. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 967-79 (1992); Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-11 (1989).
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tive due process right in the two cases because it deemed the state's interest
in regulation paramount, not because it feaked secondguessing the legislative
or municipal actions that restrict access to abortion. In contrast to the failure-
to-protect claims, the Court has not underenforced substantive due process
claims involving privacy.
A. Institutional Concerns
Several instructive analogies shed light upon the Supreme Court's
analysis in DeShaney. In her recent article, Professor Armacost relies on the
public duty cases in which state courtjudges, and sometimes legislatures, have
crafted doctrines to limit the review of tort actions against municipalities that
allege a failure to protect.9" As the court stated in Riss v. City of New York,9
"[f]or the courts to proclaim a new general duty of protection based on spe-
cific hazards would inevitably determine how the limited public resources of
the community should be allocated and without predictable limits."' Profes-
sor Armacost carefully argues that state courts have refused to review such
claims in order to avoid secondguessing the level and the distribution of
municipal services.93 On the other hand, courts permit claims to proceed if
they avoid excessive intrusion upon local governmental policy. Forcing a
municipality to expend more funds on one area of service ineluctably would
have a ripple effect on other areas. Judges are poorly equipped to monitor the
complex budgetary process that underlies much municipal policymaking.
Two analogies at the federal level further illustrate the Supreme Court's
reluctance to secondguess administrative policy that implicates sensitive
financial and distributive issues. First, the Court has determined that the
discretionary function exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)94 bars
any tort claim that challenges a governmental action that implicates the alloca-
tion of agency resources. Second, it has found challenges to an agency's
failure to act presumptively unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).95 Although neither context raises questions of constitutional
90. See Armacost, supra note 41, at 995-1002; see also Eaton & Wells, supra note 59,
at 128-30. Doctrinally, municipalities generally retain immunity in the absence of a special
relationship between the municipality and the victim.
91. 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
92. Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61 (N.Y. 1968) (dismissing suit by
woman who alleged that police failed to protect her from former boyfriend despite her several
requests for protection).
93. See Armacost, supra note 41, at 1012 (addressing courts' hesitation to look into
political decisions behind service allocations).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994).
95. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
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propriety, the Supreme Court has blocked review of administrative action in
both contexts without denying that critical individual rights existed. Indeed,
the Court has recognized that thejudge-made bars to review can be overturned
by legislative action and has indicated that it would review such claims
against the government upon congressional direction.
Consider the discretionary function exception in the FTCA. Although
Congress waived immunity for many negligence suits, it excluded claims
"based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."96
Many claims under the FTCA mirror the claims that were raised in DeShaney
which challenged the government's failure to take appropriate protective
measures. For instance, in UnitedStates v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines),97one of the plaintiffs alleged that employees
of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) negligently certified the in-
stallation of a cabin heater fuel line.98 Because the FAA's method of inspec-
tion stemmed from financial policy concerns, the Court determined that the
discretionary function exception shielded the employees' inspection activ-
ities.99 Similarly, lower courts have held the government immune from
challenges that were based on the government's failure to protect individuals
from third parties. For instance, in Judy v. Department of Labor,'" the court
of appeals found that the exception barred a challenge based on the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Agency's allegedly negligent inspection of a hydrau-
lic shaping press at the plaintiffs workplace.'0 ' As long as the govern-
ment's action is "grounded in social, economic, and political policy,"'0
namely how best to ensure safety, the discretionary function exception bars
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
97. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
98. The Court in Varig Airlines addressed companion cases. See United States v. S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814-15 (1984).
99. Id. at 820-21.
100. 864 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1988).
101. Judy v. Department of Labor, 864 F.2d 83, 84-85 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusing to review
claim based on negligent inspection of hydraulic press); see Piechowicz v. United States, 885
F.2d 1207, 1210(4th Cir. 1989) (alleging failureto protectgovemmentwitness from third-party
harm); Lively v. United States, 870 F.2d 296,297(5th Cir. 1989) (affirming plaintifflongshore-
men's suit against United States that alleged negligence in failing to warn plaintiffs of asbestos
dangers); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 122-23 (3d Cir.
1988) (denying recovery when plaintiff alleged that Environmental Protection Agency was
negligent in cleaning up third party's toxic waste site); see also Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d
243, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1967) (alleging failure to protect juror).
102. VarigAirlines, 467 U.S. at 814.
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the action."3 The Court's refusal to review such claims, however, is not
tantamount to a finding that the government's failure to protect was reason-
able.
Courts, however, can review agency actions that stem from resource
allocation questions when Congress so directs. Congress can eliminate or
amend the discretionary function exception and expose the government to
more intrusive review. The Court has never intimated that the discretionary
function exception is constitutionally mandated. Congress determines the
extent of judicial oversight over administrative policy.
Even absent revision of the statute, the Court has stated that it will not
apply the discretionary function exception if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
agency's action transgressed a statute or regulation. Thus, in Berkovitz v.
UnitedStates,"'0 the plaintiff suffered severe injury after a polio inoculation."°5
The plaintiff alleged in part that federal officials violated a federal regulation
by releasing a specific lot of polio vaccine that did not comply with govern-
ment standards.0 6 The Court suggested that, if the officials had "no rightful
option but to adhere to the directive,"'0 7 then the exception did not apply.
Regulations, like statutes, permit review even when "social, economic, and
political policy" is implicated.0 8
A similar dynamic can be seen in cases that challenge an agency's refusal
to act under the APA,0 9 which precludes review of matters "committed to
agency discretion by law."" 0 InHecklerv. Chaney,"' the plaintiffs challenged
the Food & Drug Administration's alleged failure to enforce the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act."2 The plaintiffs asserted that the drugs had not been
tested for use in lethal injections and thatthe use ofthe drug for capital punish-
ment constituted an "unapproved use of an approved drug.""' The Court
declined to review the action, finding agency failures to enforce presumptively
103. Id. at 819-20.
104. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
105. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 533 (1988).
106. Id.
107. Id. at536; see Collins v. United States, 783 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying
application of discretionary function exception to Mine Safety and Health Administration
official's decision to reopen mine).
108. See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
109. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1994).
110. Id. § 701(a)(2).
111. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
112. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823 (1985).
113. See id.
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unreviewable." 4 Justice Rehnquist explained in part that:
an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing
of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the
agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether
agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the
agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement
action requestedbest fits the agency's overallpolicies, and indeed, whether
the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.... The
agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many vari-
ables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities." 5
Courts are poorly equipped to secondguess the priorities supporting the
decision against enforcement." 6 Therefore, when confronted with a challenge
to the agency's allocation of scarce enforcement resources, the courts should
ordinarily decline review. As in the FTCA context, the judicial decision not
to review the merits of the agency's action does not suggest approval.
Congress, however, can override the presumption and direct review
despite the resource allocation questions involved. The Chaney presumption,
much like the VarigAirlines decision, reflects the Supreme Court's hesitancy
to become involved in the myriad resource allocation questions confronting
bureaucracies. Should Congress authorize review, then courts must grapple
with resource questions, irrespective of the agency's presumed superior
expertise. As the Court stated, "we essentially leave to Congress, not to the
courts, the decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings
should be judicially reviewable."" 7
Consider the plaintiffs' challenge in National Wildlife Federation v.
EPA"' to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) refusal to initiate
proceedings to withdraw a state's enforcement responsibility for safe drinking
water after finding excessive contaminants." 9 Despite the resource allocation
114. 1d at838.
115. Id.at831.
116. Using similar reasoning, the Supreme Court refused to review the Indian Health
Service's decision to reallocate resources from the Indian Children's Program in the Southwest,
which provided diagnostic and treatment services to handicapped children, to a nationwide
effort to assist such children. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) ("Like the
decision against instituting enforcement proceedings... an agency's allocation of funds from
a lump-sum appropriation requires a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise." (citations omitted)).
117. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838.
118. 980 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
119. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765,769 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining
challenge to EPA's promulgation of rule under Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f
(1994)).
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issues implicated, the court of appeals concluded that the challenge to the
agency's failure to begin proceedings was reviewable under the APA because
Congress had withheld enforcement discretion from the agency. The statute
compelled the agency to begin an enforcement action upon finding specified
contaminants in the water supply. 2 '
Thus, the FTCA and the APA examples illuminate the DeShaney deci-
sion. DeShaney plausibly rests not on interpretation of the Due Process
Clause, but on the Court's perception of its institutional limits and on its
consequent decision not to enforce the Due Process Clause fully. Federal
courts should not secondguess municipal agency resource allocation decisions
in the absence of a congressional directive.' 2 ' However, DeShaney should not
be construed as a definitive construction of the Constitution any more than
VarigAirlines" represents a primer on negligence.
B. Federalism Limits
Unlike the FTCA and the APA examples, the federal court challenge
in DeShaney directly implicated federalism values, providing further reason
for federal judicial caution. Federal courts cannot review failure-to-protect
claims without secondguessing the political priorities of a municipality."
Our federal system presupposes that municipalities can govern free from
excessive federal judicial intrusion.24 Federal judicial micromanagement
prevents local governments from serving the needs of their constituents and
from experimenting with different levels and packages of municipal
services.'25 Moreover, states cannot "serve as a 'counterpoise' to the power
120. See id. at 773-74; see also Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1183-86 (3d Cir.
1989) (suggesting that courts can review agency decisions that are otherwise unreviewable
under the APA for inconsistency with another statutory command).
121. Most challenges to governmental inaction have some connection to budgetary
questions, however attenuated. Some challenges, however, can undoubtedly be reviewed by
courts without intruding impermissibly into municipal governance. But, courts may lack
confidence in their ability to make case-by-case evaluations in the absence of a congressional
directive.
122. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
123. Sovereign immunity bars failure to protect claims directed at federal agencies.
124. Cf Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 790 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If we want to preserve the ability of
citizens to learn democratic processes through participation in local government, citizens must
retain the power to govern, not merely administer, their local problems.").
125. Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
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of the federal government" 2 6 if federal court supervision undermines states'
initiatives. 27
DeShaney plausibly reflects the inability of federal courts to consider
failure-to-protect claims without secondguessing, and ultimately influencing,
the municipality's political priorities. Respect for state and local governmen-
tal politics counsels restraint. DeShaney, therefore, may not turn solely on the
merits of the due process claim presented.
Judicial conservatism in DeShaney may parallel the Supreme Court's
curtailment of habeas remedies in federal court. Among other changes,' the
Supreme Court has refused to secondguess a state court conviction unless the
petitioner can demonstrate that any asserted constitutional violation was
recognized at the time of the alleged infraction.'29 Federal courts will inter-
vene not when constitutional error exists, but only when the error reflects
inexcusable misjudgment on the part of state officials. Moreover, the peti-
tioner must demonstrate that any constitutional error at a state court trial "had
a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's ver-
dict."'30 Denial of a habeas petition often reflects federalism concerns more
than the Court's view of the merits of the federal constitutional claim. Apart
from the DeShaney context, therefore, federal courts resolve challenges
raising federal constitutional claims without definitively construing the consti-
tutional rights invoked.
126. Ataseadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239 n.2 (1985) (discussing Fram-
ers' beliefs about states' role in governmental system).
127. For an exploration of federalism values, see generally Symposium, Federalism's
Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1994).
128. For instance, the Court has eased a state's burden to demonstrate that a state court
decision rests on independent and adequate state grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991) (construing ambiguous state court decision to rest on state procedural grounds,
therefore precluding federal court review); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977)
(holding that most claims dismissed in state court for procedural default are barred from federal
court review). The Court has also made it more difficult to relitigate factual issues decided in
state court. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,306 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (comment-
ing that Teague v. Lane may signal that both questions of law and mixed questions of law and
fact are tested in federal court by reasonableness standard); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1, 6-12 (1992) (increasing showing needed to obtain evidentiary hearing in federal court).
129. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,301 (1989) ("[A] case announces anew rule if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final." (emphasis in original)); see also Butlerv. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,409 (1990) (applying
Teague). Congress has incorporated Teague into its revised habeas framework. See Anti-
terrorism and EffectiveDeath Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1214,
1217 (1996).
130. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 776 (1946)) (discussing standard ofreview for constitutional error in state court
cases).
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Federalism concerns support the Supreme Court's reluctance in De-
Shaney to enmesh the judiciary in controversies over the level and the distri-
bution of municipal services. DeShaney resembles other recent Supreme
Court decisions that limit the ability of individuals to challenge local policies
in federal court."' Just as in the habeas corpus context, ajudgment against a
litigant for failure to protect does not decide the merits of the constitutional
claim. DeShaney thus leaves elaboration of due process protections to other
actors within our political system. The actors may interpret the Due Process
Clause more broadly than did the Supreme Court in DeShaney, unfettered by
the Court's federalism and institutional concerns.
32
131. The Court has raised substantial justiciability hurdles to prevent much litigation of
constitutional questions. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055,
1068-69 (1997) (dismissing civil rights challenge to state constitutional provision for lack of
standing and justiciability); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-58 (1996) (placing substantial
obstacles before inmates who challenge inadequate prison law libraries); City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,105 (1983) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge municipal
policy of using chokeholds to subdue dangerous suspects); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,372-
73 (1976) (concluding that challenge to allegedly unconstitutional practices of Philadelphia
police department was nonjusticiable).
132. Also, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court for the first time upheld a
substantive due process challenge to a punitive damages award. See BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996). The Court in Gore concluded that the two million
dollar award (reduced by the Alabama Supreme Court through remittitur from four million
dollars) was excessive. Id. at 585. But the majority's opinion, as well as Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting opinion, leaves room for state courts to enforce a more activist substantive due
process jurisprudence in the punitive damages context.
Although the Justices in Gore agreed on little, they all articulated concern for displacing
state control over assessment and review of the punitive damages remedy. To Justice Scalia,
who dissented in Gore, the magnitude of the Court's undertaking was nothing short of startling:
"By today's logic, every dispute as to evidentiary sufficiency in a state civil suit poses a question
of constitutional moment, subject to review in this Court. That is a stupefying proposition."
Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The federalism concern helped bolster
Justice Scalia's conviction that no constitutional issue was implicated. See id. at 599 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
The majority in Gore did not ignore the fact that the authorization of substantive due
process challenges to punitive damage awards would interfere with the civil justice systems in
the several states. See id. at 568-69. The majority recognized that "[s]tates necessarily have
considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow in
different classes of cases and in any particular case." Id. at 568. The majority parted company
with Justice Scalia in concluding that the particular award was so "extraordinary" as to warrant
invalidation. See id. at 586 n.41.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg echoed the federalism concerns, urging greater "respect due
the Alabama Supreme Court." Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She argued that the
Supreme Court should be loathe to intrude "into territory traditionally within the States'
domain." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). More than the majority, she would rely upon state court
justices, or state legislatures, to cure any flaws in each state's punitive damages system. Id. at
613-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But Ginsburg's opinion also focused on the institutional
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Although DeShaney appears to rest on federalism and institutional
concerns, the Justices may have relied on such reasoning only to bolster their
construction of the Due Process Clause. Nonetheless, the language in the
decision sends a message. The Justices intentionally may have signaled other
actors to afford greater scrutiny to the due process rights at stake. If state
courts or legislatures subsequently provide greater due process protection,
they then spare the Court the necessity of intruding excessively into state and
local politics. By underenforcing constitutional norms, therefore, the Court
may facilitate ultimate recognition for those rights without suffering the
institutional consequences of increased caseload and increased opportunity for
conflict with state and local governance. Just as in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 3 underenforcement may reflect a strategy of
enforcing constitutional rights indirectly to avoid the political or the institu-
tional pitfalls of more direct enforcement.'
III. Overenforcement
Underenforcement represents the Court's strategy in the face of institu-
tional barriers to the full recognition of a constitutional right. If the obstacles
to recognition instead stem from political actors, then the Court may over-
enforce a constitutional right to protect the underlying constitutional interest.
Given the political interests of state and federal legislatures,judicial interven-
tion may be critical.
Indeed, the Court has explicitly upheld constitutional remedies that extend
beyond the actual constitutional violation. For instance, in Hutto v. Finney,3'
the Court considered the propriety of an injunction that, in part, prevented
Arkansas from isolating inmates for longer than thirty days. 36 The Court did
obstacles confronting the Supreme Court. The Court, in Ginsburg's view, "is not well equipped
for this mission." Id. at 612-13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Benchmarks to assess the difference
between an excessive and grossly excessive award are wanting. She saw the institutional
challenge as more daunting in this context because "the Court will work at this business alone.
It will not be aided by the federal district courts and courts of appeals." Id. at 613 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). The majority retorted that the institutional "consideration surely does notjustify
an abdication of our responsibility to enforce constitutional protections." Id. at 586 n.41. But
the majority then limited that "responsibility" to "an extraordinary case such as this one." Id.
Although for different reasons, the majority would underenforce the due process guarantees as
would Justice Ginsburg.
133. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
134. Cf Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735,767-80
(1992) (arguing, in effect, that federal courts underenforce constitutional remedies in light of
majoritarian-pressures).
135. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
136. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1978).
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not defend the restriction solely on the ground that placement in isolation on the
thirty-first day violated the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual
punishments. The Courtjustified the injunction instead on the ground that the
bright-line rule represented "a mechanical - and therefore easily enforced -
method of minimizing overcrowding."1"' Because of the difficulty in determin-
ing when conditions violated the Eighth Amendment, and in light of the Court's
understandable mistrust of the Arkansas prison system,'38 the Court imposed
a prophylactic remedy to help protect against future violations. 39
Judges may protect against conduct threatening constitutional violations
by formulating broad constitutional rules as well as by fashioning extensive
remedies. Both approaches stem from a similar motivation. Courts may lack
the resources to police unconstitutional conduct in any other way. 4 ' Over-
enforcement of a constitutional right avoids linedrawing in contexts in which
courts cannot rely upon other governmental actors to protect the constitutional
right asserted. When the Court chooses not to rely upon legislatures or lower
courts to enforce rights - the mirror image of the underenforcement context -
overenforcement presents a viable option.
The Miranda decision, much like the decision in Reynolds v. Sims,'
constitutes a peculiar type of constitutional ruling. The Court adopted specific
constitutional rules out of whole cloth that superseded prior precedent and that
were only tenuously connected to the constitutional text.
Prior to Miranda, the Court analyzed the admissibility of confessions
under a general voluntariness standard derived from the Due Process
Clause. 2 Miranda changed the inquiry by holding that no statements arising
137. Id. at688n.1l.
138. The Court pointedly related the grisly conditions in the Arkansas facilities, which
included stabbings, rapes, and primitive barracks conditions. See id. at 681 n.3.
139. See id. at 687-88; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,281-82 (1977) (stating
that constitutional remedies may redress more than conditions that were determined to be in
violation of Constitution).
140. For a close analogy, consider as well the Supreme Court's resolution of cases brought
under the dormant Commerce Clause. Although the Court exercises the authority to invalidate
protectionist measures, Congress ultimately may permit state restrictions on interstate commerce
that the Court has banned. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,
669-70 (1981) (finding Iowa statute that limits length of vehicles on state highways unconstitu-
tional). This ruling was overridden, in part, by amendments to the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1983).
141. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Reek v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 434-35 (1961); Crookerv. California,
357 U.S. 433,438-39 (1958). Courts assessed voluntariness by examining factors such as the
degree of police pressure, the suspect's physical and psychological situation, and the length of
questioning.
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from custodial interrogation of suspects would be admissible at trial unless the
suspects were first apprised of their rights.143 The familiar four-fold warnings
include that the suspect has the right to remain silent, that anything said could
be used against the suspect, that the suspect has a right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if indigent, the suspect has a right to an attorney at the
taxpayer's expense. 4' Such safeguards were necessary, the Court reasoned,
in light of the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogations.'45 The Court
did not trust law enforcement officials to honor the Fifth Amendment right
that protects against self-incrimination.'46 Perhaps the Court feared that, given
the social realities of the 1960s, the incentive to obtain incriminating state-
ments would be too strong to resist. The Supreme Court has since applied the
Miranda requirement to cases arising in the state system as well as to federal
habeas corpus challenges.'47 Thus, under one reading, the Miranda result
appears to be a constitutional requirement.
Yet, other language in Miranda, as well as that in subsequent cases,
paints a very different picture. The Court hoped that its ruling would "encour-
age Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly
effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws."'48 The Court further explained:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress and the States in the exercise
of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore, we cannot say that the
Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the
inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently con-
ducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have that effect. 49
In subsequent cases, the Court seemingly has reaffirmed that view. For
example, the Court stated in Oregon v. Elstad.. that "a failure to administer
143. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
144. Id. at 479.
145. See id. at 467 ("IWiithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interroga-
tion ... contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.").
146. See id. at 445-56 (outlining police interrogation tactics and procedures).
147. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 682-83 (1993) (holding that federal habeas
jurisdiction extends to state prisoner's claim that rested on Miranda violations); see also Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985) (applying Miranda to case appealed from Oregon Court
of Appeals).
148. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
149. Id.
150. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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Miranda warnings is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment."' Simi-
larly, in Michigan v. Tucker,'52 the Court commented that Miranda's "proce-
dural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but
were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation was protected."" 3 Miranda may therefore constitute a prophylactic
rule to protect against the admission of involuntary statements.
Institutional concerns arguably support this understanding of Miranda.
Prior to Miranda, the Court had struggled in fashioning an effective test to
determine the voluntariness of statements to police.'54 Given the coerciveness
inherent in custodial investigations, whether physical or psychological, the
Court could not reliably ascertain whether the statement had been voluntary. '55
Moreover, because of difficulties in reconstructing such interrogations,
156
bright-line rules would help "to insure that what was proclaimed in the Consti-
tution had not become but a 'form of words,' in the hands of government
officials."'57 The Miranda warnings responded to the Court's limited institu-
tional ability to protect, in the custodial context, the voluntariness of a sus-
pect's statements and the suspect's right against self-incrimination.
151. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n.1 (1985).
152. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
153. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
154. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and
methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in
cases such as this where it is necessary to make fine judgments as to the effect of
psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an
accused.
Id. The critical inquiry was whether the physical or the psychological coercion was of such a
degree that "the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed." Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
155. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966). The Court in Miranda
described the difficulty in making "[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed"
as to the right to remain silent. Id. at 468. In addition, the Court noted the "evils" present in
the interrogation atmosphere. Id. at 456. The Court previously had explained that "coercion
can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of
an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
156. The Court explained that "[t]he difficulty in depicting what transpires at such
interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they have largely taken place incommuni-
cado." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. The Court also noted that "[p]rivacy results in secrecy and
this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation
rooms." Id. at 448; see id. at 470 (arguing that presence of attorney will enhance trustworthi-
ness of subsequent testimony regarding interrogation).
157. See id. at 444 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920)).
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The Court acknowledged that any overenforcement of the Fifth Amend-
ment norm prevented states from structuring law enforcement interrogations
in a different manner. To assuage the federalism problem, the Court ex-
plained that "the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the
privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in
informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continu-
ous opportunity to exercise it."' Thus, Miranda contemplates a role for
states in the ultimate elaboration of the voluntariness inquiry under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The overenforcement perspective sheds light on what otherwise poses a
substantial puzzle in the Court's Mirandajurisprudence: If Miranda merely
reflects a prophylactic procedural rule, how can the Court compel state courts
to follow its terms?'59 The Court has disclaimed the power to impose supervi-
sory rules on state courts. Rather, its power "is limited to enforcing the
commands of the United States Constitution.""' If Miranda reflects a proce-
dural rule, the Court cannot easily justify its imposition of that rule on state
courts.
Properly viewed, however, Miranda's rules are not merely supervisory
but are rooted in the Constitution itself. The Court can describe Miranda as
based upon its "interpretation of the Federal Constitution"' despite its
description of Miranda in cases such as Elstad as sweeping "more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself" 62 because overenforced constitutional
norms retain their constitutional status."' The Court must create doctrinal
158. Id. at 490.
159. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,319 (1994); Minnick v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680-81 (1988).
160. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209,221 (1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over statejudicial proceed-
ings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension.").
161. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986).
162. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
163. Some commentators have questioned the legitimacy of the Court's Mirandajurispru-
dence. Professor Grano, for instance, has argued extensively that the Court lacks the power to
impose what he terms "prophylactic rules" of procedure on the states. See GRANO, supra note
46, at 173-98. When these prophylactic procedural rules are tied so closely to the exercise of
a constitutional right, however, the legitimacy objection recedes. The Court's power to resolve
constitutional questions confers upon it the authority to craft constitutional doctrine, and the
necessity to formulate doctrine inevitably includes enforcement concerns. Like the choice
between standards and bright-line rules, the decision whether to overenforce a constitutional
right stems in part from concern over whether others will respect the constitutional norm in the
future. Overenforcement, therefore, represents an efficacious means for the Court to ensure
sufficient protection for an underlying norm that might otherwise be eroded due to political
officials' intransigence.
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rules for lower courts and political officials to follow. Enforcement consider-
ations properly influence a great deal of constitutional decisionmaking. " The
Court's enforcement strategy includes forging rules to protect against future
incursions of the right at stake.
The Court's decision in Withrow v. Williams6' can be understood in like
vein. 6 6 In Williams, the Court held that a state prisoner who alleges a Mir-
anda violation states a constitutional claim that is cognizable on federal
habeas review. Unlike the exclusionary rule crafted under the Fourth Amend-
ment,167 failure to heed the Miranda warnings constitutes a violation of "fed-
eral law" or the "Constitution" for purposes of the habeas statute. The Court
explained that "prophylactic though it may be, in protecting a defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards a
fundamental trial right."' 68 The overenforcement perspective helps make
sense out of the Court's otherwise conflicting pronouncements with respect
to the voluntariness of statements during custodial interrogations. Prophylac-
tic or not, the Miranda warnings are based on the Constitution and they stem
from the Court's enforcement choice to create bright-line rules to facilitate
compliance with the constitutional right to be free from coercive interrogation.
Thus, the Court overenforced the Fifth Amendment norm to promote law
enforcement officials' respect for the constitutional rights implicated in
custodial interrogation.
IV Ramifications of the Enforcement Perspective
If DeShaney and Miranda can be understood in part on institutional
grounds, then other actors within our system remain free to interpret the Due
Process and Self-Incrimination Clauses to different effect. Ofprincipal signif-
icance, Congress and (perhaps) lower courts can reassess for themselves the
scope of the failure-to-protect claim rejected in DeShaney and the procedural
framework mandated in Miranda.
In our system of governance, judges do not own a monopoly on constitu-
tional interpretation. Legislators and administrators also interpret the Consti-
tution while performing their functions. Pastjudicial interpretation may guide
164. The political question doctrine presents a paradigm. See supra note 35.
165. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
166. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 683 (1993).
167. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) (distinguishing Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule as one designed to deter illegal searches and seizures).
168. Williams, 507 U.S. at 691 (citations and emphasis omitted). In addition, even if
Miranda claims were not cognizable on habeas, the petitioners could still bring due process
claims based on the same factors that the Court hoped to avoid by mandating Miranda warn-
ings. Id. at 693.
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them, but the judicial gloss is binding on legislators and administrators only
in particular cases and controversies. 69
A. Congress and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress might disagree with the Court's decision in DeShaney for a
variety of reasons. As an initial matter, it might not accept the Court's inter-
pretation of the Due Process Clause.' Moreover, Congress does not confront
the same institutional and federalism constraints as does the Court. With
respect to federalism concerns, Congress may be more willing to secondguess
municipal or state juridical discretion because its members are more account-
able to states and municipalities and, presumably, more sensitive to their
needs.' Members of Congress may be more familiar with the state and local
interests that enforcement of the federal rights threatens, and their judgment
as to the significance of those interests may diverge from that of the Court.
In addition, Congress need not fear the same institutional consequences from
encouraging suit because any proliferation of lawsuits will not tap Congress's
administrative resources directly. As a result, Congress might determine that
a more expansive interpretation of the Due Process Clause is warranted.
169. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 707, 747 (1985) ("Members of Congress have both the authority and the capability to
participate constructively in constitutional interpretation."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217,221-27 (1994)
(discussing shared power among legislative, judicial, and executive branches to "say what the
law is"); Neal E. Devins, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 661, 662 (1986) (book review) ("Congress and the executive are undoubtedly autho-
rized to interpret the Constitution.").
170. Members of Congress obviously do not always consider independently the constitu-
tionality of legislative proposals. They may prefer courts to make the tough calls in disputed
areas. Nonetheless, as a historical matter, there is evidence of quite diligent efforts by Congress
to interpret the Constitution and it remains within Congress's prerogative to legislate based
upon members' views of constitutional propriety. See supra note 169.
171. See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PRocEss (1980) (analyzing Court's role in democratic political process); D. Bruce La Pierre,
The Political Safeguards ofFederalism Redux: Intergovernmental mmunity and the States as
Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982) (discussing state autonomy as check on
congressional power); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
ofFederalism after Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 341 (discussing status of state-national relations
after Garcia); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954) (discussing impact of states on development of national legislation).
172. See Wechsler, supra note 171, at 548 (noting, for instance, that "the Senate is intrin-
sically calculated to prevent intrusion from the center on subjects that dominant state interests
wish preserved for state control").
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The tension between decisions of the Court and congressional interpreta-
tion of the Due Process Clause is not merely of academic interest. For example,
assume that Congress wishes to create a cause of action for individuals injured
by a state or local government's failure to protect them from harm at the hands
of identifiable third parties. Can Congress through legislation reverse De-
Shaney and subject municipalities to suit for failure to protect their citizens?
Congress might not be able to subject municipalities and states to suit for
at least three reasons. First, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Lopez 73 augurs a far more restrictive realm of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. 74 Subjecting municipalities to suit for their failure to
protect individuals from harm may lack a sufficient nexus to interstate com-
merce. 75 Second, the congressional action, even if consistent with Commerce
Clause principles, may, regardless of Garcia, violate the Tenth Amendment.
Congress may not be able to intrude so markedly into a local government's
allocation and distribution of benefits by forcing increased provision of
municipal services.7 6 Finally, although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
Congress from subjecting municipalities to suit in federal court, Congress
cannot, under the Commerce Clause, subject state governments to suit in a
federal forum, at least when damages are at stake.'77
Congress's power to enact such a cause of action, however, might instead
rest upon Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 provides that
"Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."'78 Thus, Congress might attempt to enforce the Due
Process Clause by subjecting municipalities to suit for their failure to protect
citizens from known harms, just as § 1983 currently subjects municipalities
to suit in other contexts.17 9 How can Congress act to enforce due process
guarantees that the Court claims do not exist? 9
173. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
174. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
175. See id. (finding that only "[w]hen economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce [will] legislation regulating that activity... be sustained").
176. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (finding unconstitutional
federal statue that required local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on
handgun purchases); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (finding that Tenth
Amendment prohibited Congress from commandeering states in regulatory endeavor); see also
Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming decisionto strike down partofDriver's
Privacy Protection Act); ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387,1394 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking down
mandatory steps imposed on states under Lead Contamination and Control Act of 1988).
177. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (concluding that
Congress lacks power under Commerce Clause to subject states to suit in federal court).
178. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5.
179. Congress can subject states to suit when it acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
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InKatzenbach v. Morgan,3 0 the Supreme Court upheld a federal require-
ment that prohibited states from using English literacy tests to prevent natives
of Puerto Rico from voting.' The Court had previously acknowledged that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not itself prohibit states from conditioning the
eligibility to vote on literacy tests.8 2 In Morgan, the Court did not reach the
question of whether New York's literacy requirement, as applied, violated the
Equal Protection Clause."' Instead, the Court upheld the federal enactment
on the ground that the Court would defer to Congress's determination that
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act was an appropriate means of enforcing
the Equal Protection Clause.' More recently, the Court in City ofBoerne v.
Flores'8 5 reiterated that "[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress's enforcement power even
if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and
intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
States."
8 6
In City of Boerne, however, the Court also stated that Congress's inter-
pretive role under Section 5 was limited.8 7 The Court explained that, al-
though Congress "has been given the power to 'enforce"' it has not been given
"the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."' The
Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976) (upholding attorney's fee
award against state because Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Act was based on Section 5 of Four-
teenth Amendment).
180. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
181. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643 (1966) (upholding Section 4(e) of
Voting Rights Act of 1965).
182. See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (finding that
English language literacy requirement did not violate either Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
ment).
183. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649.
184. Id. at 653-56. For a sampling of commentary on Congress's Section 5 powers, see
Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1995); Stephen L. Carter, The
Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CmI. L.
REv. 819 (1986); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act: The ConstitutionalSignificance ofan Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REv. 39
(1995); Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 199 (1971).
185. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
186. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2163 (1997) (quoting Fitzpatrick v.
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Court concluded that "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or de-
signed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." 89 Legislators enjoy the power
to interpret the Constitution for themselves, yet the Court has no apparent
reason to defer subsequently to legislation that is based on a constitutional
interpretation different than its own. 90
The underenforcement thesis, however, provides a different perspective.
If the Court has underenforced the Due Process Clause for institutional and
federalism reasons, Congress can prohibit conduct pursuant to Section 5 even
if the Court has previously held that due process challenges to that conduct
are not actionable in federal court.'91 Congress's interpretation would not
supersede that of the Court because the Court's initial interpretation did not
define the outer boundaries of the right at stake. Thus, in City of Boerne, the
Court invalidated the legislation only after determining - despite possible
arguments to the contrary'92 - that its prior construction of the Free Exercise
Clause was not based on institutional or federalism factors. If Congress
disagrees with the Court's decision in DeShaney, Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment may provide a vehicle with which it can remedy the Court's
189. Id. at2170.
190. The Court left open some of the perplexing questions that have long surrounded
Congress's Section 5 powers. For instance, is Congress institutionally better positioned to
determine which measures are necessary to enforce rights protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment? Should courts defer to congressional interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when such interpretations dilute the enforcement otherwise attainable in court? The Court
in Morgan stated that it was willing to defer only when Congress enhanced protection for
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). It
explained that although Congress enjoyed discretion in determining how best to enforce equal
protection guarantees, it could not "restrict, abrogate, or dilute those guarantees." Id. at 651
n.10.
191. See Sager, supra note 50, at 1239-42; see also McConnell, supra note 1, at 185-88.
192. See Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REv. 1,
59 (1993) (arguing that institutional concerns were central to Court's prior Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence). Indeed, the Court in Department of Human Resources v. Smith noted that
applying a compelling interest test required it to ascertain whether the state legislation that
prevented the individual from observing religious principles was "'central' to the individual's
religion," which is like forcing the Courtto engage in "the unacceptable 'business of evaluating
the relative merits of differing religious claims."' Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (citation omitted).
The determination of what decisions address constitutional claims to their full conceptual
limits is not free from controversy. As part of its responsibility to decide cases and controver-
sies, the Court must decide whether a constitutional adjudication in a prior decision was
underenforced or overenforced. Irrespective of the ultimate resolution of the constitutional
question, the intervening dialogue with lower courts and legislatures will have aided the Court
in its task.
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forbearance.193 Congress, after all, in other contexts can provide more rights
than those recognized by the Supreme Court.194 Just as enforcement agencies
rely on other entities, principally private parties, 195 to enforce statutory provi-
sions, the Supreme Court also at times can rely on Congress to help protect
constitutional rights.
B. Congress's Power to Restrict Overenforcement Decisions
Along with the power to expand protection of rights through Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress should be able to alter the means for
protecting any right overenforced by the Supreme Court. An overenforced
norm leaves room for other institutional actors to protect the underlying
constitutional right in a different way. If adequate safeguards exist, the Court
can reassess its prior ruling and can limit judicial protection for the right at
stake. If Congress requires police to record electronically all custodial interro-
gations, 96 for instance, the Court should reassess the continuing need for
193. Similarly, consider whether Congress can adopt a tort reform measure that cir-
cumscribes the award ofpunitive damages nationwide, for example, to a multiple of compensa-
tory damages received. That measure could rest on Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
Legislative proposals to date have evidently rested on that basis. In the 104th Congress, for
example, two Senators introduced a bill to limit all punitive damages awards to a multiple of
three times the "economic injury on which the claim was based or $250,000," whichever figure
is greater. Lawsuit Reform Act of 1995, S. 300, 104th Cong. § 9(a). However, Congress's
Commerce Clause authority might not extend to all punitive damages contexts. For example,
it is difficult to perceive the nexus to interstate commerce when a state defendant is sued for
conduct that occurred solely within that jurisdiction. To remove doubts, Congress could
predicate the tort reform measure on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the absence
of the institutional constraints confronting the Court, Congress might adopt a more robust view
of due process protections that shield litigants from excessive punitive damages awards. The
Court should subsequently defer to any congressional interpretation of the claim that is
plausible.
194. For example, Congress can direct that greater protection be afforded litigants who are
defending against punitive damages claims, despite the discretion otherwise afforded juries
under common law systems. Both Houses of Congress voted to implement such an approach
through passage of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995. H.R. 10, 104th Cong.
§ 103(c)(2) (limiting punitive damages in product liability cases to three times actual economic
injury or $250,000, whichever is greater).
195. Private enforcement of public rights is pervasive, including the Clean Water Act, the
Securities Exchange Act, and the False Claims Act. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the
UnitaryExecutive: CongressionalDelegations ofAdministrativeAuthority Outside the Federal
Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 84-93 (1990) (illustrating various delegations to private
individuals and groups).
196. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. 387,486 (1996) (suggesting, as have others, videotaping alternative); Yale Kamisar,
Brewer v. Williams: A HardLook at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEo. L.J. 209, 233-43 (1977-
78) (recommending judicial imposition of mandatory use of sound recording devices in
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Miranda warnings, at least in the same form.197
Although Congress has passed no such measure, it has not greeted
Miranda with silence.19 In 1968, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).199
Section 3501(a) provides that "in any criminal prosecution brought by the
United States," a confession "shall be admissible in evidence if it is volun-
tarily given."2" The statute requires trial judges to make a threshold determi-
nation of voluntariness outside the presence of the jury and directs voluntari-
ness to be assessed based on the totality of the circumstances. According to
the statute, relevant circumstances include whether the "defendant was ad-
vised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any
such statement could be used against him," and whether the suspect had been
advised of the right to counsel.2"' Section 350 1(b) cautions that the "presence
or absence" of any particular factor "need not be conclusive on the issue of
voluntariness of the confession.""2 2
On its face, the statute conflicts with Miranda. Specifically, under the
statute, Miranda warnings are no longer mandatory but rather are relegated to
factors in the overall voluntariness inquiry. Confessions that would have been
thrown out underMiranda could well be admitted into evidence under § 3501.
The legislation endeavors to recreate the doctrine that existed prior to
Miranda. To the extent relevant, the legislative history confirms Congress's
intent to supersede Miranda.z°3 However, any congressional attempt to
interrogations). Other options certainly are possible. Over sixty years ago, Paul Kauper sug-
gested an alternative of bringing an arrest suspect before a magistrate for questioning. See Paul
G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused- A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH.
L. REv. 1224, 1228 (1932).
197. Such an enactment would not be viewed universally as an adequate substitute for
Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial
Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 556-57 (1996).
198. Great Britain, however, has adopted such a measure. See RoYAL COMMIssIoN ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 39 (1993). So, too, have Alaska and Minnesota. See Stephan v.
State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518N.W.2d 587,592 (Minn. 1994).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1968).
200. Id.
201. Id. § 3501(b).
202. Id.
203. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 51 (1968). The Senate Report explained that:
[b]y the express provisions of the proposed legislation the trial judge must take into
consideration all the surrounding circumstances in determining the issue of volun-
tariness, including specifically enumerated factors which historically enter into such
a determination. Whether or not the arrested person was informed of or knew his
rights before questioning is but one of the factors.... No one can predict with any
assurance what the Supreme Court might at some future date decide if these
provisions are enacted.
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reverse a Supreme Court constitutional interpretation runs afoul of the bed-
rock principles enshrined in Marbury v. Madison.2" Otherwise, as the Court
recently reiterated in City ofBoerne v. Flores, "[s]hifting legislative majorities
could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and
detailed amendment process contained in Article V."2°
On the other hand, if Miranda can be understood as overenforcing the
constitutional norm, then Congress's decision to revisit the admissibility of a
suspect's statements to law enforcement investigators may be appropriate.
Miranda seemingly envisaged that possibility, and subsequent judicial deci-
sions have stressed that Miranda's rules are prophylactic.
For example, in Michigan v. Tucker,2" the Court considered whether to
admit testimony from a suspect about a witness who later incriminated the
suspect at trial.207 The suspect had received incomplete Miranda warnings.208
The Court nonetheless upheld admission of the testimony on the ground that
the police conduct at issue "did not abridge respondent's constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the
prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard
that privilege."2 ' The Court in Tucker stressed that Miranda did not
"require[ ] adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions
of the interrogation process.210 The Court concluded that Miranda
recognized that these procedural safeguards were not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected .... The sug-
gested safeguards were not intended to create a constitutional straitjacket,
but rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right against compul-
sory self-incrimination. 21
Subsequent to Tucker, the Court has continued to describe the Miranda
warnings as "prophylactic" rather than as "compelled" by the Fifth Amend-
Ia Comments on the floor of the House were similar. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 16,066 (June
5, 1968) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 114 CONG. REC. 16,074 (June 5, 1968) (remarks of Rep.
Corman).
204. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
205. City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1997) (striking down Religious
Freedom Restoration Act on ground that Congress had exceeded its authority under Section 5
of Fourteenth Amendment).
206. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
207. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,437 (1974).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 446.
210. Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
211. Id (citation omitted).
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ment.212 In Oregon v. Elstad, the Court considered whether to exclude,
pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, a statement not preceded
by Miranda warnings that led to a later confession accompanied by appropri-
ate warnings." 3 In holding that the confession was properly admitted, the
Court explained that the Miranda rule "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself.... Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy
even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm. '2 14
In light of such opinions, the only question that remains is whether
§ 3501 appropriately reflects Congress's efforts to provide alternative safe-
guards to ensure that statements to law enforcement investigators are volun-
tary. Taken in isolation, § 3501 cannot satisfy Miranda's call for alternative
safeguards for the simple reason that it imposes no alternative constraints
upon law enforcement officials to safeguard the voluntariness of statements
made by suspects. The United States Department of Justice's continuing
refusal to rely on § 3501 might be explicable on the basis that it does not wish
to defend the statute.25 Rather than provide alternative safeguards, the statute
attempts to restore the multifactor voluntariness approach that existed prior
to Miranda. Articulation of a new doctrine cannot satisfy the Court's invita-
tion for imposition of different safeguards during custodial interrogations.
Thus, even if some legislation can obviate the necessity for the Miranda
warnings, § 3501 does not qualify.
Consider, however, the United States District Court for the District of
Utah's recent decision in United States v. Rivas-Lopez.16 In Rivas-Lopez,
state troopers stopped the defendant for a speeding violation. 27 After noticing
what appeared to be drug residue, the troopers requested and received permis-
sion to search the rest of the vehicle.218 The troopers advised the defendant
212. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,457 (1994); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492
U.S. 195, 202 (1989); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985).
213. Elstad, 470U.S. at300.
214. Id. at 306-07; see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (stating that
Miranda warnings are necessary to "reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim
to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation"); United States v. Crocker,
510 F.2d 1129, 1137 (10th Cir. 1975) (suggesting constitutionality of§ 3501).
215. The Department's position has not been consistent, but overall it reflects, at best, a
reluctance to rely on the statute. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, UNITED STATES JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT, REPORT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL ON LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION 72
(1986) (describing implementation of § 3501 as "abortive"); see also Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 462-65 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (castigating Department of Justice for
ignoring § 3501).
216. 988 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Utah 1997).
217. United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1426 (D. Utah 1997).
218. Id.
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of his Miranda rights, and the defendant twice responded that he did not wish
to waive his rights.219 When the officer later asked whether he would talk "out
of Miranda," the suspect agreed and made incriminating statements.2 0
In resolving the subsequent motion to suppress, the district court focused
on whether Miranda or § 3501 would apply. The troopers apparently violated
Miranda, but the question of admissibility under § 3501 was unclear. The
court stated that "[t]he validity of Sections 3501(a) and (b) therefore depends
upon whether Miranda imposes constitutional requirements or is an exercise
of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the administration of crimi-
nal justice in the federal courts."'" The court held that Miranda merely was
procedural, applied § 3501, and ordered a new evidentiary hearing to explore
the relevant factors.' The court, however, framed the wrong inquiry, as had
the one court of appeals case that previously addressed § 3501.' Despite its
procedural flavor, Miranda plainly has constitutional roots and has been
consistently explained in that way. 4 The pertinent question, rather, is
whether sufficient alternative safeguards now exist to obviate the need for the
Miranda warnings.
Since Miranda, several significant changes in the legal landscape have
occurred. First, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,' the Court held
that individuals could sue government officials directly for constitutional
injuries suffered. 6 After Bivens, individuals can recover - contingent upon
official immunity doctrine- for injuries arising out of coercive interrogations.
For instance, in Wilkins v. May,7 the Seventh Circuit remanded for trial a
claim that police misconduct during a custodial interrogation - questioning at
gunpoint - violated the Fifth Amendment: "Interrogation so coercive is a
form of criminal procedure incompatible with the traditional liberties of the
subject.""8  Coercive questioning may constitute the basis for a Bivens
claim.229
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1426-27.
221. Id. at 1430.
222. Id at 1436.
223. See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 1975) (upholding
trial court's decision to admit evidence under § 3501).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
225. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
226. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
227. 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989).
228. Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1989).
229. Moreover, victims of police overreaching can now sue municipalities directly under
§ 1983 for any unconstitutional policy. See Monnell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
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Second, Congress itself waived the federal government's immunity from
such claims in a 1974 amendment to the FTCA.23 In response to publicity
surrounding several notorious raids by federal law enforcement personnel,
Congress authorized suit under the FTCA for Bivens claims as well as for
some intentional torts that are based upon acts or omissions of law enforce-
ment officers23' As a result, both the government and law enforcement
officers can now be sued for abusive interrogation tactics.3 2
Finally, although the data are hardly conclusive, some evidence exists
that law enforcement officials abuse suspects' rights far less than during the
era preceding Miranda. Greater training and greater stress on internal disci-
plinary machinery existY3 Moreover, there may be greater social acceptance
for the right to be free from coercive interrogations than there was prior to
Miranda. In sum, the combination of possible civil suits against federal
officers, constitutional and other tort actions against the federal government,
and greater internal control over law enforcement personnel may have re-
moved the imperative for the prophylactic Miranda warnings.
From a process perspective, however, Congress's means of effecting
change in police interrogation has been wanting. Congress did not try to
impose substitute restrictions upon law enforcement officials to ensure
voluntariness. Rather, it tried to overrule Miranda without observing such
niceties. Congress made no response to the Court's call for alternative safe-
658 (1989). This option did not exist at the time of the Miranda decision. See generally
Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 168 (1961).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994).
231. Id. § 2680(h).
232. Cf. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
possible FTCA claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of arrest by law
enforcement officials). Criminal penalties are currently theoretically available against law
enforcement officials as well. See United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1226-27 (1997)
(construing 18 U.S.C. § 242 to apply to constitutional injuries inflicted by officers acting under
color of state law).
233. See NEAL A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACTOF
MnRANDA 208-20 (1971) (describing impact of Miranda on interrogation behavior); JEROME
H. SKOLNICK& JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVETHELAW: POLICEAND THEEXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 18-
20,58-59 (1993) (asserting that law enforcement officials currently use less force in questioning
defendants, due in part to better training, than in decades past); Paul G. Cassell and Bret S.
Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43
UCLAL. REv. 839,871-76 (1996); Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The
Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENy. U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1970) (asserting that Denver police
had much improved rate of proper Miranda warnings because of better training); Richard A.
Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America,
in THE MIRANDA DEBATE 65, 65-66 (1998) (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds.,
1998).
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guards. It was not until after the enactment of § 3501 that Congress made
other changes that minimized the need for Miranda warnings.
Some might consider the process failure to be dispositive. Courts argu-
ably can force procedural obligations on Congress. If Congress fails to com-
ply with such procedures, then courts need not defer. In light of Congress's
failure to debate and adopt alternatives to the Miranda warnings, the Court
might refuse to reexamine the continuing need for the warnings.
A similar debate over the respective roles of Congress and the Supreme
Court has arisen in the context of judicial encouragement of legislative
findings in Commerce Clause cases. In UnitedStates v. Lopez,"5 the Supreme
Court invalidated the congressional enactment of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act on the ground that Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce
Clause to reach activity that had such an insubstantial connection to interstate
commerce. 6 In reaching that decision, the Court noted that "to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment
that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here."" Properly drawn congressional findings can help support
statutes that courts would otherwise invalidate on constitutional grounds."8
Congress's failure to include findings may lessen, though not completely elim-
inate, the deference accorded to its legislative product. In both the Commerce
Clause and the Fifth Amendment settings, the Court seems to have signaled
to Congress to effect change only through certain procedures. The Commerce
Clause precedent suggests that Congress's failure to comply with such proce-
dures may lessen the deference due a coordinate branch of government.
Important differences, however, arguably distinguish the legislative
findings context in Lopez from that in Miranda. Lopez required the Court to
ascertain the limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause to
infringe state interests. Given that states, at least to some extent, are repre-
sented in Congress through the electoral process, 9 the existence of explicit
234. See supra text accompanying notes 230-32 (describing amendment of FTCA, most
notable of changes made following enactment of § 3501).
235. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
236. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
237. Id. at 563.
238. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (requiring
Congress to justify affirmative action legislation with specific findings because "classifica-
tions based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic, it is especially important
that the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified") (citation omitted); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971) (upholding congressional power to regulate loan
sharking).
239. See Garciav. SanAntonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-54 (1985) (noting
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legislative findings provides some guarantee that Congress-has considered the
allocation of authority question fully. The presence of legislative findings,
therefore, helps the Court determine whether the legislation stayed within
Congress's Commerce Clause confines.
In contrast, the post-Miranda issue is not legislative power per se but
how best to protect Fifth Amendment rights. The Court's responsibility after
Miranda is to determine whether sufficient alternative safeguards to Miranda
warnings exist to ensure the voluntariness of statements and to protect the
right against self-incrimination. Those safeguards need not be attributable to
Congress's action. They might instead stem from reform internal to the rele-
vant law enforcement agencies, from judicial developments as with Bivens,
or from judicial developments in the several states.24
Section 3501's existence, therefore, may be irrelevant except as a spur
for courts to reexamine the need for the Miranda warnings. The Court has the
continuing responsibility to assess change in the broader legal landscape.24
Plausible, though hardly overwhelming, arguments suggest that such change
has indeed occurred.242
C. Lower Court Judges
1. State Court Judges and Underenforcement
Viewing DeShaney as underenforcing the Due Process Clause may have
a profound impact on state judges as well. Arguably, state judges should be
free to construe the federal Due Process Clause shorn of the institutional and
the federalism restraints that face the Court. State courts need not hesitate for
fear of encroaching on the domain of another sovereign, and they may believe
that, under the state constitutional framework, a greaterjudicial role is appro-
priate. Ascribing an independent role to state courts to enforce federal consti-
tutional rights is no doubt controversial. Nonetheless, the logic of under-
enforcement suggests that state courts at times should be free to enforce fed-
that structure of federal system provided inherent protections to state interests); see also PHILIP
BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIoNAL FATE 191-95 (1982) (developing view that Congress protects state
sovereignty); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards ofFederalism Redux: Intergovern-
mental Immunity and the States asAgents ofthe Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779,804-960 (1982)
(describing states' role in federal system); Wechsler, supra note 171, at 546-47 (describing role
of states in selection and composition of Congress).
240. See infra text accompanying notes 326-31.
241. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1483-1538 (1987) (arguing that courts must consider entire legal landscape when
interpreting statutes); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common
Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 527-40 (same).
242. See supra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
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eral constitutional rights more vigorously than would their federal counter-
parts. 3 If the Due Process Clause has been underenforced, the Court should
not disturb a state courtjudgment that affords greater rights than those recog-
nized in DeShaney as long as the state court decision rests on a defensible
interpretation of the clause.2" The Court, like any federal enforcement
agency, beneficially may leave some enforcement activities to lower-level
officials, in this instance, the lower courts."4
Enforcement at the local level makes sense from a federalism perspec-
tive. Unlike the Court in DeShaney, state courts face no federalism obstacles
when enforcing federal constitutional decrees. Ifunderenforced constitutional
claims are brought against state and local officials in state court, then state
judges must determine whether officials within their own jurisdiction should
be subjectto suit.246 Moreover, the institutional constraints that influenced the
Court's decision in DeShaney do not inevitably affect state courts similarly.
With respect to failure-to-protect claims, some state constitutions value
majoritarian rule less than the federal Constitution. In addition, state judges
are often more politically accountable for their decisions than are their federal
counterparts.
In somejurisdictions, state courts occupy amore fundamental lawmaking
role than do the federal courts within the federal system. Many examples of
this point exist. For instance, although the Supreme Court decided in 1812
243. State courts, for instance, could have permitted a Bivens-type claim prior to the
Supreme Court's decision, and even today could presumably permit wider recovery. See infra
text accompanying notes 326-31. State courts have permitted Bivens-type claims for violation
of state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. and Tel.
Co., 595 P.2d 592, 602 (Cal. 1979); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465,
477-78 (N.J. 1978).
244. For more than a century, Congress declined to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction
over state court decisions that relied on an arguably overgenerous construction of federal
constitutional provisions. See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (1914) (providing, for
first time, Supreme Court review of state court decisions that "may have been in favor of..'.
title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution, treaty, statute, commission,
or authority of the United States"); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1066 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning importance of Supreme Court jurisdiction when state
courts have decided cases in favor of asserted federal right).
245. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits ofFormalism,
1997 Sup. CT. REv. 199,230-33; Krent supra note 195, at 80-84. Indeed, the Court routinely
relies on lower courts, both federal and state, to resolve federal constitutional questions.
246. State courts also should be able to impose limitations on the civil justice system that
they superintend regarding punitive damages claims. As Justice Kennedy noted in his concur-
rence in Pacific MutualLife Insurance Co. v. Haslip, "[w]ere we sitting as state court judges,
the size and recurring unpredictability of punitive damage awards might be a convincing
argument to reconsider those rules." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,42(1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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that federal courts could not develop a common law of crimes without imping-
ing, in part, on congressional authority,247 state courts well into this century
have continued to define new crimes on a common law basis.4 For example,
in 1994, the Michigan Supreme Court decided that the state could prosecute
Dr. Kevorkian under a common law prohibition of assisted suicide.249 More-
over, state courts have continued to fashion common law even after federal
courts limited their own authority in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins." In addition
to exercising more general lawmaking power, 1 many state courts have
engaged in far wider rulemaking than their federal counterparts. The state
court rulemaking has covered both matters of internal judicial governance and
the power to regulate legal practice within the state5 2
Similarly, justiciability doctrines seldom limit the ambit of state courts
to the same extent as they limit federal courts. There is no requirement of
Article III standing in state courts. In fact, most states have adopted a far less
restrictive test of standing than that adopted by the Court for the federal
judiciary. 3 A number of states permit courts to issue advisory opinions as
to the legality of proposed legislation, 4 a practice which, if followed under
247. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). Despite
Hudson & Goodwin, today federal courts exercise common law power in construing and
applying open-ended terms of federal criminal legislation. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and
Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 345, 347.
248. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mochan, I10 A.2d 788, 790-91 (Pa. 1955) (creating
crime of making obscene telephone calls).
249. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994) (fashioning crime of aiding
and abetting suicide). The Court relied on the Michigan saving clause, which provided, in part,
that "[a]ny person who shall commit any indictable offense at the common law... shall be
guilty of a felony." MICH. COM. LAWS § 750.505 (1993). Cf Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1972) (denying enforcement of crime against loitering that statute
did not sufficiently demarcate).
250. 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
251. See Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227,248
(1973) (noting state courts' broad lawmaking powers); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common
Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805-06 (1989) (noting general perception of legitimacy of state
common law and illegitimacy of federal common law).
252. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J.
1319, 1319 (1979); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 399 (1984).
253. See Williams, supra note 252, at 400; see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of
New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988) ("States ... may... determine whether their courts
may ... determine matters that would not satisfy the more stringent requirement in the federal
courts that an actual 'case or controversy' be presented for resolution."); City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113 (1983).
254. Colorado, Florida, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota all
permit courts to issue advisory opinions regarding the legality of proposed state legislation.
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the federal system, would violate Article 1B." s
Finally, state courts are more politically accountable than the courts
within the federal system. First, most state court judges are directly responsi-
ble to the public through elections." The electorate can mobilize to defeat
any judge that it deems insufficiently deferential to the state legislature.
Judges have been voted out of office because of public outcry over their
decisions." Second, state court decisions are more subject to constitu-
tional amendment than are federal decisions."s The barriers to amendment
under the state constitutions are lower, and empirical studies have borne out
the comparative frequency with which states have amended their constitu-
tions. 9
In short, state courts have less reason to defer to municipal and state
policymaking than their federal counterparts. Our theory of federalism
presupposes that states are free to allocate responsibility among their own
judiciary, legislature, and executive as they see fit. From a federalism per-
spective, it may be entirely appropriate for state courts to assume a more
aggressive role in monitoring municipal conduct than could a federal court.
Historically, some state courts have imposed upon municipalities a duty to
protect, elevating that responsibility to the "first duty" of government.26
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2, at 47 n.1 (2d ed. 1994). For instance,
Chapter III, Part II, Article H of the Massachusetts Constitution states that "[e]ach branch of the
legislature, as well as the governor or the council, shall have authority to require the opinions
of thejustices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn
occasions." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. HI, pt. II, art. II (Law. Co-op. 1997).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943); Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
256. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725-26 (1995).
257. Id. at 727-39. Although the vast majority ofjudges are reelected, notable exceptions
exist. Three Supreme Court Justices from California, for instance, lost reelection bids in 1986
principally because of their opposition to the death penalty. See PHELIP E. JOHNSON, THE
COURT ON TRIAL: THE CALIFORNIA JUDIcIAL ELEcTION OF 1986, 2-3 (Supreme Court Project
ed., 1985) (discussing, prior to election, impact of controversial decisions on judges' re-
election). The impact of voter accountability on death penalty decisionmaking has also been
studied in Louisiana. See Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts:
Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1117-23 (1987); Melinda Gann Hall,
Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American States, 23 AM.
POL. Q. 485, 495-97 (1995).
258. See Williams, supra note 252, at 381.
259. See, e.g., Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, in 17
PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 153, 169-79 (1987).
260. See Heyman, supra note 59, at 520-45 (presenting historical account of imposition
of duty to protect).
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Consider the California Supreme Court decision in Garcia v. Superior
Court.261 In Garcia, the court considered a DeShaney-type challenge to a
parole officer's failure to protect the plaintiff's mother from the threats of a
parolee, the plaintiff's former boyfriend.262 In communicating with the
mother, the parole officer allegedly minimized the magnitude of the danger
posed by the parolee. 263 Following DeShaney, the court refused to find a
violation of the Due Process Clause.2' Nonetheless, the court found that the
parole officer could be sued under state negligence law because no institu-
tional obstacles blocked that suit.265 Therefore, to the extent that the Court in
DeShaney predicated its decision on institutional concerns, the California
court conceivably could have allowed the suit to proceed under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 66
261. 789 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1990).
262. Garcia v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 960, 962-63 (Cal. 1990).
263. 1d. at 962.
264. Id. at 966-67. State courts have applied DeShaney in a number of contexts. See, e.g.,
Henderson v. Romer, 910 P.2d 48, 53-54 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (barring due process claim
against prison for failing to protect prison employee in hostage situation), aff'd sub nom.
Henderson v. Gunther, 931 P.2d 1150 (Colo. 1997); Cleveland v. Fulton County, 396 S.E.2d
2, 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that state is under no duty to provide emergency medical
treatment); Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
state is under no duty to protect victim of domestic violence); Williams v. Secretary of the
Executive Office of Human Servs., 609 N.E.2d 447,457 (Mass. 1993) (finding that DeShaney
does not require state to provide follow-up care for homeless who are mentally ill); Gazette v.
City of Pontiac, 536 N.W.2d 854, 859-60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (following DeShaney in
finding that police have no duty to assist victim of crime).
265. See Garcia, 789 P.2d at 963-66; see also California First Bank v. New Mexico, 801
P.2d 646, 657-58 (N.M. 1990) (finding that Due Process Clause does not require state to
provide minimum level of highway safety, but permitting state tort suit against county); Brodie
v. Summit County Children Servs. Bd., 554 N.E.2d 1301, 1305-09 (Ohio 1990) (finding that
municipality's Children Services Board could be sued under state law for falling to protect child
from repeated abuse at home, while assuming that no DeShaney claim existed); Sabia v.
Vermont, 669 A.2d 1187, 1193-97 (Vt. 1995) (finding that DeShaney does not permit suit
against Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services for failing to protect teenagers from
sexual abuse, but allowing state tort suit to proceed).
If adequate state remedies exist, as in Garcia, fashioning relief under the federal Due
Process Clause may be unnecessary. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534-36 (1984);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676-82 (1977); see also Strauss, supra note 59, at 84-86.
Even if state courts should rely on state grounds whenever possible before reaching the federal
claim asserted, adequate state remedies may not always exist. See infra text accompanying
notes 281-86.
266. Consider as well the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Life Insurance Co. of
Georgia v. Johnson, which was subsequently vacated and remanded in light of Gore. See
generally Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 288
(1996). In Life Insurance Co. ofGeorgia, an insurance company challenged a punitive damages
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Nevertheless, state court interpretations of the Due Process Clause that
extend the clause beyondDeShaneywould jeopardize uniformity. Potentially,
the existence of numerous inconsistent interpretations could create a baffling
array of constructions and more than "one" Due Process Clause.267 The
uniformity objective is important, but it can be overstated. In important ways,
constitutional interpretation is not currently uniform.
First, as mentioned previously, actors within our system may construe
constitutional provisions differently. For example, legislators are free to enact
measures that restrict the right to bodily autonomy more than the Court's
precedents would allow.268 Similarly, irrespective of judicial precedent,
presidents and governors may pardon individuals whom they believe were
prosecuted unconstitutionally, or they may veto legislation that they deem
unconstitutional.269 If the controversy winds up in court, then the Court's
award on substantive due process grounds as well as on state law grounds. See id. at 690-91.
In addressing the claims, the Alabama court imposed stringent new requirements on punitive
damage awards in that state, including a requirement that the jury consider the amount of
punitive damages in a separate proceeding. Id. at 696. In addition, the court directed the trial
judge to instruct the jury as to the factors underlying the punitive damages determination. These
factors previously were a consideration for judges in Alabama on review, not for thejury. Id.
at 696-97. The court also ruled that a portion of a punitive damages award should be judicially
set aside for use of the state to minimize windfalls. Id. at 697-99. The court did not base its
ruling on the federal Due Process Clause, but rather on its inherent powers. See id. at 704-07
(Maddox, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that court should have addressed federal constitutional
claims more explicitly). Other state courts have reviewed challenges to punitive damages
awards under state law principles. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1086
(Ariz. 1987) (holding punitive damages awards subject to review for excessiveness); Loitz v.
Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397,401-07 (II1. 1990) (increasing scienter requirement for
plaintiffs seeking punitive damages awards); Carawan v. Tate, 280 S.E.2d 528, 531 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1981) (award of punitive damages "is not to be excessively disproportionate to the
circumstances").
To the extent that Gore is based on institutional and federalism factors, the Alabama court
in Life Insurance Co. of Georgia could have relied upon substantive due process principles to
effectuate those changes. The court's ruling in Gore arguably set a floor for due process rights
in the punitive damages setting, not a ceiling for such rights. Cf Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d
1348, 1350-56 (Cal. 1991) (relying, in part, on federal due process principles in mandating that
evidence of defendant's financial condition be presented tojury before punitive damages award
is set). On remand, however, the Alabama court abandoned its prior procedural innovations to
conform more closely to the model described in Gore. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So.
2d 524, 525-34 (Ala. 1997).
267. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337-52 (1816) (justifying
Supreme Court review of state decisions by virtue of need for uniformity); see also Alexander
& Schauer, supra note 6, at 1372-81 (arguing that settlement function of law strongly supports
uniformity of views regarding constitutional text).
268. See BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS
73-155 (1993) (discussing legislative efforts in wake of Court's decision in Roe).
269. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1988) (discus-
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interpretation, one hopes, will gain precedence. But not all cases in which
there are conflicting interpretations of constitutional provisions will be heard
in court.270
Second, some state courts have undermined uniformity by construing
their state constitutional provisions as more protective of individual rights
than the parallel provisions in the federal constitution.27' In the wake of the
Burger Court's pullback from some of its predecessor's criminal procedure
rulings, state courts invested their own constitutions with greater protec-
tions.272 States must honor the federal constitutional guarantees as a floor, but
they can provide greater safeguards by interpreting their own constitutional
provisions more expansively.273 Each state is free to determine for itself what
sing President Reagan's direction to agencies to ignore stay provisions in Competition in Con-
tracting Act), vacated in part en banc, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989). In 1955, President
Eisenhower instructed the Secretary of Defense to ignore a legislative veto clause contained in
the Department of Defense Appropriation Act. President Eisenhower stated that the provision
"will be regarded as invalid by the Executive Branch of the Government... unless otherwise
determined by a court of competentjurisdiction." Special Message to Congress Upon Signing
the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, PUB. PAPERS 689 (1955). More recently,
President Clinton reluctantly signed a 1996 defense authorization bill that required dismissal
of HIV-positive members of the military. See Statement on Signing the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 32 WEEKLY COM. PRES. Doc. 260, 261 (Feb. 19,
1996). President Clinton explained that the Attorney General would not defend the dismissal
provision. Id.
270. See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1983)
(finding that dispute between Administrator of EPA and Congress over extent of presidential
privilege was not justiciable).
271. Some state courts have afforded greater substantive due process protections than the
federal Due Process Clause permits. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336-
37 (11. 1996) (finding that Illinois substantive Due Process Clause confers right upon defendant
to show that he was actually innocent of crime for which he was convicted, even though federal
Due Process Clause does not afford such protection); Women's Health Ctr. of West Virginia,
Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 663-67 (W. Va. 1993) (finding that statute banning use of
state Medicaid funds for abortion violated state but not federal due process guarantee). In
addition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts suggested that it may, in the appropriate
case, construe its state constitutional due process provision more expansively than the federal
counterpart. See In re McKnight, 550 N.E.2d 856, 863-64 (Mass. 1990) (finding that federal
Due Process Clause does not require state to provide specific treatment for mentally ill in state
institution). The suggestion sparked a disavowal from Judge Lynch in concurrence. Id. at 865
(Lynch, J., concurring). Furthermore, California has interpreted its Due Process Clause to
confer greater procedural protections than the federal counterpart. See People v. Ramirez, 25
Cal. 3d 260, 265-69 (1979).
272. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489,498-502 (1977). See generally Symposium, The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985).
273. For example, state courts can restrict the immunity of state officials who are sued for
federal law violations by implying a cause of action under federal law and by recognizing only
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rights beyond the federal baseline it wishes to guarantee.274 As a result, there
may be only one Fourth Amendment, but no uniform right to be free from
unreasonable searches.2"
When state courts rest their decisions on both state and federal grounds,
the potential confusion is exacerbated because state courts immunize them-
selves from review by the Supreme Court. Under the independent and ade-
quate state grounds doctrine, the Court will not review a state court decision
if an independent state ground exists, even if the decision includes an analysis
of a federal constitutional guarantee.276 Thus, pronouncements about the
Fourth Amendment and the right to be free from unreasonable searches may
be inconsistent.
2 77
To be sure, a state court ruling predicated on a federal constitutional
guarantee has a different impact than a decision based on a state constitutional
provision. The state constitutional amendment process cannot overturn a
decision that is based on a federal constitutional guarantee. State courts
therefore could insulate themselves from reversal by predicating their deci-
sions on underenforced federal constitutional norms as opposed to state con-
stitutional provisions.
The objection is serious, but it is not devastating to the underenforcement
thesis. If state courts construe federal constitutional guarantees in indefensi-
ble ways, then the United States Supreme Court can overturn the decisions,
despite the underenforcement. Moreover, potent political checks on most
limited immunity. See Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bill ofRights Claims,
63 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1289-98 (1985). To the extent that immunities are fashioned through
common-law elaboration, there is no reason that state courts should not be able to subject their
officials to liability under federal law in more contexts than the federal courts might allow on
their own. See infra text accompanying notes 293-305.
274. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, State Constitutional Torts: DeShaney, Reverse-Federalism
and Community, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 949,957-59 (1995) (arguing that because DeShaney was, in
part, grounded on federalism concerns, state courts can interpret parallel state constitutional
provisions more vigorously).
275. Indeed, Justice Harlan was one of many who argued that Bill of Rights provisions
should not be fully incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather that the states could
be allowed to adopt divergent interpretations in applying those protections against state actors.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
276. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1037-41 (1983); Sager, supranote 50, at 1250;
see also Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts, 54
MIss. L.J. 371,397-413 (1984) (discussing state cases in which state courts insulate theirviews
on federal law from review by United States Supreme Court).
277. Compare Ann Althouse, Federalism Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1215-18
(1994) (debunking uniformity objective) with Donald L. Beschle, Uniformity in Constitutional
Interpretation andthe-BackgroundRighttoEffective Democratic Governance, 63 IND.L.J. 539,
559-69 (1988) (addressing allure of uniformity concerns).
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statejudges still exist, including electoral disapproval.27 State court decisions
too solicitous of federal rights may well precipitate a backlash from the state
legislature or executive.
For example, Florida courts interpreted the federal and state constitu-
tional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures more expansively than
the United States Supreme Court. Under the independent and adequate state
grounds doctrine, those decisions were immune from review by the Supreme
Court.279 The Florida legislature, however, adopted - and voters approved -
a constitutional amendment stating that "[a]rticles or information obtained in
violation of this right [against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall not
be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissi-
ble under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution.""28 Majoritarian pressures
reined in the judiciary. Thus, state courts are unlikely to abuse the opportu-
nity to interpret federal constitutional norms more expansively than their
federal counterparts.
Nonetheless, some might argue that if state courts choose to hold munici-
palities liable, then those courts should do so under state law, as California did
in Garcia. Given a choice, state courts should avoid construing the federal
constitution and should instead rest their decisions on state law grounds.
Although many state courts would choose to rule on state law grounds, that
alternative might not be available. Most states have interpreted their own due
process clauses in tandem with the federal analogue.28 Unless the state courts
untether their constitutional provisions from the federal counterpart, they have
no choice but to rest their decisions on federal grounds.
Even if the option to decide a case on state law grounds existed, state
courts need not travel that path. Under our system, state courts have the full
obligation and the responsibility to interpret federal law. Federal courts do
not have a monopoly on federal constitutional interpretation. In fact, our
system of interlocking sovereignties depends on state courts' willingness to
reach federal questions. Under the Supremacy Clause,2" 2 federal law displaces
278. See supra text accompanying notes 256-58.
279. State v. Lavozzoli, 434 So. 2d 321, 323-24 (Fla. 1983).
280. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (amended 1982); see Bemie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988,991-92
(Fla. 1988) (upholding constitutional amendment); see also EnglerAttacks Judge on Prisoners'
Rights, ANN ARBORNEWS, Aug. 13, 1994, at A6 (reporting Governor John Engler's attack on
state judiciary and Governor Engler's comment, "I think it's time to get tough on liberal
judges").
281. See, e.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,422 (1991); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209, 218 (1982).
282. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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any inconsistent state law. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Howlett
v. Rose:283 "The laws of the United States are laws in the several states, and
just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the state laws
are .... The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which consti-
tutes the law of the land for the State."2  State courts must apply their inter-
pretation of federal constitutional provisions whether in harmony with the
laws of their state or not.
From a historical perspective, there was no federal question jurisdiction
in this country until 1875.28 State courts'resolved almost all federal constitu-
tional questions. The Supreme Court could review only a fraction of the
decisions involving federal claims. As a practical matter, therefore, state
courts frustrated any goal of uniformity by placing different constructions on
federal constitutional guarantees.
Moreover, the Judiciary Act of 1789 declined to vest the Supreme Court
with appellate jurisdiction over cases in which state courts upheld federal
constitutional claims.286 Congress did not confer that appellate jurisdiction
until 1914. Prior to 1914, there was no mechanism available to make uniform
state courts' constructions of federal constitutional guarantees that favored
federal claimants." 7 Therefore, a litigant's success could hinge on the forum
in which the litigant filed the claim.288 As a result, for over one hundred
years, no uniformity of construction was possible.
Given that history, some state courts might find that the federal Due
Process Clause provides greater protection than its state counterpart.2"9 For
283. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
284. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (citations omitted).
285. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
286. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see also Sager, supra note 50, at 1242-
43.
287. For example, some state courts struck down regulations based upon a more expansive
construction of the Due Process Clause than the Supreme Court manifested during the Lochner
era. See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 15 (1991) (discussing state court cases invalidating regulation
under Federal Due Process Clause prior to Supreme Court's Lochner era jurisprudence); Wil-
liam M. Treanor, Jamfor Justice Holmes: Reassessingthe Significance of Mahon, 86 GEo.L.J.
813, 835 (1998) (same).
288. The issue of removal complicates the analysis. Should a party remove a failure-to-
protect claim to federal court, federal judges should then construe the Due Process Clause as
if they were sitting as statejudges. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1984). Although state judges would
presumptively follow the Court's lead in DeShaney, federal courts should apply any previously
disclosed state court analyses of failure-to-protect claims that embrace a more expansive view
of the federal Due Process Clause. Alternatively, perhaps, state and local officials' right to
removal should be limited. See Sager, supra note 50, at 1255.
289. Cf Smith v. Department of Human Resources, 763 P.2d 146, 148-50 (Or. 1988)
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a variety of reasons, the federal constitution might be construed to afford more
protection than the state constitution for individuals who challenge punitive
damages awards or municipalities' failure to protect them from harm.2' At
a minimum, some state courts likely will continue to interpret the federal Due
Process Clause to provide at least as much protection as the state counterpart.
Thus, state courts should be free to rely on the federal Due Process Clause in
resolving failure-to-protect claims.
Allowing federal constitutional law to develop differently in one state
than in another respects the federalist nature of our system. The Court can
utilize its power through certiorari to ensure that state court constructions of
an underenforced norm do not fall beneath a federal floor. Similarly, the
Court can ensure that no state court construction exceeds the bounds of
plausibility or misconstrues a prior Court decision, which arguably explains
the Court's analysis in City ofBoerne."' Within those broad constraints, state
courts arguably should be able to adopt different interpretations of the federal
constitutional right that is best suited to their states' political culture and
needs.292
Indeed, slighting the state courts' ability to apply federal law vigor-
ously would turn federalism concerns on their head. If federal courts decline
to enforce federal law due to federalism and institutional concerns, then state
courts - unfettered by such constraints - should be free to determine whether
their different institutional situations militate for more active enforcement.
The Court's recent decision in Johnson v. Fankell293 can be seen in that
light.29 A former liquor store clerk filed a due process action in state court
under § 1983 against officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary who had
(denying unemployment compensation because religious use of peyote violated federal Free
Exercise Clause), rev'd, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
290. Currently, municipalities that are sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity.
See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,635-38 (1980). Although municipal officials
can claim the immunity, once the constitutional violation is clearly established, the immunity
would not be available. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
291. See supra text accompanying note 192. To the extent that recognition of the
underenforcement possibility provides state courts with an incentive to depart from Supreme
Court precedent, the Court may have to monitor state courts' construction of federal law more
closely than it does now. The Court, as City ofBoerne suggests, is well equipped for this task
and the addition to the workload will likely be minimal. See infra text accompanying notes
306-07.
292. As Justice Harlan noted, there should be ample room for governmental and social
experimentation in a society as diverse as ours, even concerning the content of certain constitu-
tional rights. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
293. 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997).
294. See Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1802 (1997).
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terminated her employment.295 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds of qualified immunity.296 The state trial court denied the motion.297
The defendants appealed the denial and argued that the denial of a qualified
immunity claim could be appealed under the collateral order doctrine,2 98
as it could in federal court under Mitchell v. Forsyth.99 The plaintiff re-
sponded that Idaho did not regard the denial of a qualified immunity claim
as immediately appealable and, instead, prized more highly the plaintiff's
right to vindicate his or her interests without undue delay. The Idaho Su-
preme Court agreed with the plaintiff and held that, despite the federal court
precedent Idaho did not permit officials who were sued for federal constitu-
tional violations an interlocutory appeal of the denial of any claim for immu-
nity.
30
Unquestionably, defendants in civil rights actions enjoy the right in
federal court to an immediate appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss on
immunity grounds. On the basis of federal law, the Court in Mitchell permit-
ted the appeal because the immunity right is so critical to the performance of
government functions."'
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court affirmed Idaho's decision
to deny the appeal." 2 Although the Court recognized the importance of the
defendants' interest in the quick resolution of their immunity defense, it stated
that
the ultimate purpose of qualified immunity is to protect the state and its
officials from overenforcement of federal rights. The Idaho Supreme
Court's application of the State's procedural rules in this context is thus
less an interference with federal interests than a judgment about how best
to balance the competing state interests of limiting interlocutory appeals





298. IH at 1803.
299. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
300. Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1802 (1997).
301. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (recognizing "entitlement not to
stand trial or face other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially
legal question whether the conduct of which plaintiff complains violated clearly established
law").
302. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1805.
303. Id.
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The Court recognized that state courts, due to different institutional concerns,
might afford state officials less protection from a federal constitutional claim
than the federal courts would provide.3 Our system of federalism embraces
the possibility that states will vary the level of protection that they afford to
federal interests. 5
To be sure, recognizing a more activist state court role in developing
underenforced federal constitutional norms will afford state courts cover to
ignore any Supreme Court precedent that they find problematic. State courts
can defend departures on the ground that the Court had underenforced the
relevant constitutional norm. A substantial increase in the number of state
court decisions failing to comply with Supreme Court precedent could frus-
trate the Court's ability to superintend lower court adjudication and ensure.
evenhanded application of the law.
Nonetheless, there is reason to be skeptical of any avalanche of new
cases. First, state courts historically have been unwilling to invest federal
constitutional rights with greater content than has the Supreme Court except
in rare circumstances. Second, the state courts' ability to depart from Su-
preme Court precedent should be limited to contexts in which courts can point
to explicit language in the opinions - as in Miranda and Garcia - which
presents a colorable case for underenforcement.0 6 In any event, state courts,
if they choose, now can distinguish controlling Supreme Court precedent on
grounds that others would find tenuous. The Supreme Court has cabined such
state court activism without exhausting its political and administrative re-
sources. Third, state courts, as discussed previously, 3 7 may face political
repercussions from construing federal rights expansively. Therefore, recog-
nizing a greater role for state courts when addressing an underenforced federal
304. The Supreme Court decided in Willy. MichiganDepartment ofState Police thatstates
could not be sued in civil rights suits under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 66-71 (1989). Prior to that ruling, several states had permitted suit. See, e.g.,
Uberoi v. University of Colo., 713 P.2d 894, 899-901 (Colo. 1986); Stanton v. Godfrey, 415
N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 646 P.2d
1078, 1084 (Kan. 1982).
305. -But cf National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. OklahomaTax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582,
588-91 (1995) (depriving state courts of power to enjoin state taxing authority sued under
§ 1983 for violation of dormant commerce clause when adequate legal remedy exists).
306. State courts, for instance, have upheld restrictions on abortion that seemingly fly in
the face of Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
898 (1992) (reversing Pennsylvania's spousal notification provision); Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417,450-55 (1990) (invalidating Minnesota's two parent notification rule for minors
seeking abortions); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 431-39
(1983) (invalidating requirement that certain abortions be performed only in hospitals); see also
supra note 268.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 255-58.
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constitutional norm should not precipitate widespread state resistance to
binding federal precedent.
Finally, the very dialogue with state courts over the scope of federal
rights should benefit our system. The Court will gain from additional dis-
cussions in state courts addressing the nature and boundaries of under-
enforced constitutional rights. State courts can serve as laboratories for
exploring the best way to protect federal rights. Should the Supreme Court
wish to limit the dialogue, it can eliminate references to institutional and
political restraints in its decisions. Recognizing the consequences of under-
enforcement thus may provide the Court incentive to craft its decisions more
carefully in the future.
2. Lower Courts and Overenforcement
The challenge confronting lower courts when they address an over-
enforced constitutional norm is similar. Are lower courts free to depart from
precedents that set prophylactic rules as in Miranda or Reynolds, or must they
instead abide by precedent? Even if the Court has the authority to determine
whether the Miranda warnings are still required, do the lower courts have any
independent role? As with underenforcement cases, the issue turns on the
desideratum of uniformity.
Much can be said for requiring lower courts to adhere to precedent.
Uniformity and predictability are gained if lower courts apply Miranda's
prophylactic rules until such time as the Supreme Court decides on a different
path. Law enforcement officers have readily adapted to Miranda and can
continue to do so.3"' Defense counsel, prosecutors, and trial judges will be
able to gauge the success of various suppression motions. Moreover, encour-
aging fidelity to precedent augments the Court's control over lower courts.
Accordingly, the Justice Department's current position is that only the Court
can reexamine the necessity for altering the Miranda warnings." 9
In fact, the Court has directed lower federal courts to follow its prece-
dents even when there is reason to believe that the Court might reexamine
them. For example, in Agostini v. Felton,"0 the Court reconsidered whether
the Establishment Clause barred the New York City Board of Education from
sending public school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial
308. Many law enforcement groups currently supportMiranda. See Schulhofer, supra note
197, at 599 n.20 (citing Brief for Police Foundation et al. as Amicus Curiae, Withrow v. Wil-
liams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993)).
309. See Brief for the United States at 22-24, United States v. Leong, 116 F.3d 1474 (4th
Cir. 1997) (No. 96-4876).
310. .117S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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education to disadvantaged children. 1' In 1985, the Court held such practice
to be unconstitutional. On remand, the district court issued a permanent
injunction." 2 The Court presumably accepted the case for review in light of
the substantial changes in Establishment Clause doctrine in the subsequent
twelve years. 3 The Court "reaffirm[ed] that 'if a precedent of this Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions."'314 Even though the Court's own Establishment Clause analysis
had changed, it reserved to itself the ability to reexamine the validity of its
prior precedent. The Court's position maintained its power within the judi-
ciary and fostered predictability.315
The Miranda context, however, arguably is quite different than that in
Agostini. Abandoning the specific warnings in Miranda would not over-
rule Miranda. Miranda, after all, anticipates the possibility of altering the
warnings when alternative safeguards have been adopted. 6 Administra-
tive changes within law enforcement agencies or the establishment of com-
pensation schemes may have made reliance on the warnings less critical.
Should lower federal courts be able to consider whether changes in the legal
and the administrative landscape warrant reexamination of the Miranda
warnings?
Lower federal courts routinely assess the adequacy of different remedial
schemes in several contexts. For instance, in deciding whether to imply a
remedy directly under the Constitution, Bivens instructs courts to determine
whether there is "an explicit congressional declaration that ... [plaintiff
should be] remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Con-
gress."317 Following Bivens, the Court in Bush v. Lucas"' considered whether
an aerospace engineer employed by the federal government could sue under
311. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017-19 (1997).
312. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985).
313. SeeAgostini, 117 S. Ct. at2003.
314. See id. at2017 (quoting RodriguezdeQuijas v. Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
315. See, e.g., West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752, 757-60 (4th Cir. 1998)
(following Garcia despite Court's subsequent decision in Printz); Ellis v. District of Colum-
bia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (adhering to Court precedent finding liberty
interest in some parole statutes despite subsequent Court cases that call that precedent into
question).
316. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1965).
317. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
318. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
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the First Amendment for a retaliatory demotion."9 Assuming that a constitu-
tional violation had occurred, the Court nonetheless held that, in light of the
"elaborate remedial system" established by Congress for federal personnel, the
Court would decline to recognize a Bivens action in that context. 2° Even
though the congressional remedy was not an "equally effective substitute" for
the judicial remedy sought, the Court noted that it was "constitutionally
adequate."321 Subsequent cases have extended that rationale to cover situa-
tions in which Congress considered but implicitly precluded a remedy for the
injury suffered.3" Pursuant to Bivens and Bush, therefore, lower courts have
scrutinized congressional acts to determine the effectiveness, and mere
existence, of alternative remedial schemes. Therefore, the suggested role for
lower courts under Miranda - considering the availability and the adequacy
of alternative remedial schemes - is hardly novel. 3
The Court's call inMirandaforthe study of alternative remedial schemes
should notpreclude consideration ofMirandawarnings by lower courts. Lower
courts have the duty to determine whether, in light of changes in the legal
landscape, Miranda warnings are still required. Moreover, the Court would
benefit from obtaining the view of the lower courts on § 3501's relevance to
Miranda, just as it benefits from percolation of other federal law issues.324
319. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983).
320. See id. at 388-90.
321. Id. at378&n.14.
322. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,414 (1988) (declining to recognize cause
of action in light of Social Security Act's elaborate administrative remedial scheme in which
Congress decided to provide no remedy in situation presented); Brazil v. United States Dep't
of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying Bivens claim in light of available Title
VII remedy); see also, e.g., Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988,990-94 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying
Bivens claim because there was no evidence that Congress inadvertently failed to provide
remedy); Robbins v. Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195, 1200-03 (7th Cir. 1994) (denying Bivens claim
because of availability of congressionally created remedy). Whether the Court should adopt
such a deferential stance in the face of a similar congressional response to an overenforced norm
poses a difficult question. For a discussion of this issue, see Harold J. Krent, How to Move
Beyond the Exclusionary Role: Structuring Judicial Response to Legislative Reform Efforts,
26 PEPP. L REv. (forthcoming 1999).
323. The Supreme Court has directed lower courts to preclude a remedy under one federal
statute if a more comprehensive remedial scheme exists. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (Title VII is "exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination
in federal employment"); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151-54 (1966) (declining to
find FTCA remedy when more specific worker's compensation remedy existed); Norman v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that RICO claim
is preempted by comprehensive administrative remedial scheme).
324. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedent?,
46 STAN. L. REv. 817,856-69 (1994); Michael S. Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations
on the Themes ofRobert S. Cover's JUSTICE ACCUSED, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82-83 (1989).
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Like federal enforcement agencies, the Court can gain from studying the
enforcement efforts of others.3"
State courts also should consider whether to mandate Miranda warnings
in light of the legal and institutional changes within their own states. Federal-
ism concerns strongly suggest that states should be free to experiment with
different controls on law enforcement agencies. State courts fully comply
with the Miranda decision by determining that the experimental regulation in
their own states satisfies that decision's underlying concern with protecting
the voluntariness of suspects' statements in custodial settings and with pre-
serving the right against self-incrimination.326
Consider the Supreme Court of Alaska's decision in Stephan v. State.327
In Stephan, the Court held that, under the Alaska Constitution, "an unexcused
failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place
of detention violates a suspect's right to due process."328 The court in Stephan
reasoned that such recording "is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard,
essential to the adequate protection of the accused's right to counsel, his right
against self-incrimination and, ultimately, his rightto afairtrial. 32 9 The court
further explained that because "[h]uman memory is often faulty," the taping
is critical to permit the judiciary to protect the constitutional rights in-
volved.33
In light of Stephan's requirement of an electronic recording, would it be
constitutionally permissible for Alaska to excuse one or more of the Miranda
warnings? Alaska has not taken that step.33 This Article suggests that Alaska
courts should have the power to determine whether such alternative safe-
guards undermine the continuing need for the Miranda warnings in the precise
form laid out in the Miranda decision.
The consequence ultimately might be that Miranda warnings are not
required in all fifty states. This lack of uniformity may trouble many. Our
system of federalism, however, presupposes such variation amongthe several
325. Information is critical to the effective enforcement efforts of any agency. See BREYER,
supra note 5, at 109.
326. Indeed, it would be somewhat unrealistic to relegate all claims for easing the Miranda
warnings to the Court in the first instance. The Court would be forced to assess, on a state-by-
state basis, whether the Miranda warnings were still required.
327. 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
328. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985).
329. Id. at 1159-60.
330. Id. at 1161.
331. Minnesota also has adopted a recording requirement for custodial interrogations, but
has not excused the Miranda warning requirement. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592
(Minn. 1994).
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states. A uniform rule on the voluntariness of statements currently does not
exist, nor does a uniform rule on the appealability of denials of motions to
dismiss based on qualified immunity. Indeed, enforcement of federal statutory
schemes, such as the Clean Air Act, differs as well from state to state.332
Federal enforcement does not ineluctably lead to uniformity. Decisions
overenforcing constitutional norms may lead to experimentation in each state
as to how best to protect the constitutional value at stake. The Court remains
the final arbiter, but the dialogue may well further its enforcement goals.
V Conclusion
The Supreme Court's enforcement role carries with it an important
corollary that is all too often missed. Court decisions that reject or recognize
a claim of federal right may rest on institutional concerns rather than on the
scope of the federal right itself. Therefore, at times, other political actors
faced with a distinct set of institutional constraints can vest that federal right
with different content. Underenforcement may reflect a judicial strategy to
preserve political capital while nonetheless signaling solicitude for the consti-
tutional rights at stake. Overenforcement, on the other hand, overprotects a
constitutional right due to the Court's conviction that it cannot trust other
political actors to honor the right at stake. Like agencies generally, the Court
makes decisions with an eye toward future enforcement needs.
With respectto underenforcement, DeShaney provides a helpful example.
The decision can be understood to rest on concerns of both federalism and
judicial restraint. The Court's reluctance to scrutinize the claims closely
should not be taken necessarily as a decision about the conceptual limits of the
federal due process norm.
As a consequence, other actors within our political system are free to
interpret the Due Process Clause more robustly. Congress, which does not
face comparable institutional constraints, can determine whether duty-to-
protect claims should proceed against federal government officials, or whether
such actions should be maintained against state and local government officials
pursuant to Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
State courts, in the absence of both federalism and institutional concerns, can
determine whether to allow federal due process challenges against municipali-
ties that fail to protect their citizens from harm.
332. See ROBERTV. PERCIVALETAL.,ENVIRONMENTALREGULATION: LAW, SCIENCEAND
POLICY 118 (1992) ("The principal federal pollution control schemes.., required EPA to
establish uniform national standards that can be implemented and administered by states subject
to federal supervision. Most federal environmental statutes specify that the standards they
require are minimum standards that must be set by every state, while expressly authorizing states
to establish more stringent pollution controls if they so desire.").
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Similarly, the Court's Miranda decision should spur other political actors
to debate the best means for protecting the right against self-incrimination.
Consequently, state legislators and courts may consider whether procedural
innovations apart from the Miranda warnings are sufficient to protect the Fifth
Amendment right. Because the Court in Miranda overenforced the Fifth
Amendment, lower courts can - consistent with Miranda - rule that the
famous warnings are no longer required.
Understanding DeShaney and Miranda to rest on federalism and institu-
tional concerns potentially has wider impact. They are not the only Supreme
Court decisions based at least in part on institutional constraints. In light of
its enforcement role, the Court through such decisions signals actors outside
the judiciary to debate effective strategies for enforcing constitutional rights.
The Court- like federal agencies generally-may share enforcement responsi-
bility with state and local officials. The Court's underenforcement and over-
enforcement of certain constitutional norms invites other actors to collaborate
on the ultimate contours of federal constitutional rights.
